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Blaž Torkar, PhD
Government Office for the Protection of Classified Information 
Ljubljana, Republic of Slovenia

 

MISUNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING THE OPERATION OF THE BRITISH FLOYDFORCE AMONG YUGOSLAV PARTISANS

Vol. XLII, 2/2024, pp. 381-392
https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2024.2.tor.381-392

 

ABSTRACT/RESUME:

In 1944, growing misunderstandings and suspicions began to appear between the Anglo-American Allies and Yugoslav Partisans, revolving around Anglo-American landings and the potential Anglo-American (non-)intervention, the status of King Peter II of Yugoslavia and the monarchy, the establishment of a Yugoslav coalition government, assessments of the situation in Serbia, and intelligence. After the successful Anglo-American landing in Normandy in June 1944 and the Anglo-American units advancing on the Third Reich from the west and east, the Anglo-American Allies became increasingly aware that the German units in Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia sought to retreat north as soon as possible to build a defensive belt against the Allied units. To avoid major conflicts with the Germans in the Balkans and to already stop the Germans in Yugoslavia, the Allies began providing active support to the Yugoslav Partisans. In addition to supporting sabotage activity against German communications and sending military aid to the Yugoslav Partisans, they also planned to send certain Allied military units to assist the Partisans in fighting German units. In June 1944, the Anglo-American forces in the Adriatic were reorganized, with aviation taking the leading role. The Balkan Air Force (BAF) was formed and the land forces, whose role became less important through the reorganization, were combined into Land Forces Adriatic (LFA). The main Anglo-American base was on the island of Vis, but the Anglo-American units operated not only on Vis and other Dalmatian islands, but also on the Yugoslav mainland in southern Dalmatia and Montenegro. The plan was to only provide assistance and support to the Partisan movement, with no major Anglo-American campaign or landing whatsoever envisaged. Anglo-American operations in Yugoslavia were also planned to be supported by the Fairfax air base near Zadar, but because of opposition from Tito it never became fully operational. With prior permission from Tito, a British artillery unit called Floydforce landed in Dubrovnik on October 28th together with its protecting units, and it soon established contact with the 2nd Corps Partisan units. Together with the Partisans and supported by the BAF, Floydforce participated in several attacks on German units, including operations Risan and Podgorica. The leadership of the Partisan movement and especially its secret police, officially called the Department for People’s Protection (OZNA), kept a close eye on the activities of the British units in Yugoslavia because Tito was concerned that the Greek scenario would also play out in Yugoslavia. Tito placed greater emphasis on the Soviets as allies and, first and foremost, he wanted Yugoslavia to be liberated by the Yugoslav Partisans without the help of the Anglo-American Allies. Floydforce assisted the Partisans for the last time in the Mostar and Zadar areas, after which the Partisans began to reject Anglo-American assistance. Floydforce left Yugoslavia on January 20th, 1945, together with its supporting and protection units after intervention from Tito, who no longer allowed British units to be involved in Yugoslavia’s liberation.

 

KEYWORDS: Second World War, Allies, United Kingdom, Floydforce, Yugoslavia, Partisan army

 

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