
ALBANIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE AGREEMENT OF MUKJA BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONALISTS

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ABSTRACT: *The meeting of representatives of “Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar” (National Liberation Front) and “Balli Kombëtar” (National Front) in Mukja on 1-2 August 1943 was one of the most significant political events in Albania during the Second World War. The effort to form a united front in the war against Nazi-fascism did not succeed, as the Communist Party rejected the agreement. As a result of extreme politicization and the historical revision of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War in its entirety, the causes of failure continue to divide both public and scientific opinion. The only way to evaluate the Agreement of Mukja without bias is to conduct a critical historical analysis of both the political and military positions of the Balli Kombëtar organization, as well as those of the Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar (Albanian Communist Party). The influence of the Yugoslav emissaries on the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party alone does not sufficiently explain the ending of this agreement. This article will provide a comprehensive account of this significant event for Albanians during the Second World War. Its significance stems from the fact that Mukja exemplifies Albanians’ inability to unite in a single front in the war against the Nazi-fascist invaders, and even pitted them against each other.*

KEYWORDS: Albania, Second World War, German Occupation, Albanian Communist Party, Enver Hoxha, Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar, Balli Kombëtar, Agreement of Mukja

Introduction

Albania was among the first countries in Europe to fall victim to fascist aggression in World War II. The invasion of Albania on April 7, 1939, was the continuation of the long-standing fascist policy of Italy. It reached its highest point when, as a result, Albania lost its independence. The invasion was strongly rejected,

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as made clear by the voluntary armed resistance against the landing of the Italian army in Albanian ports.¹ Over time, the Albanian anti-fascist movement became more organized.² The establishment of the Albanian Communist Party and its engagement in the war structured Albanian anti-fascism. The political landscape further advanced with the creation of the political organization *Balli Kombëtar* in November 1942.

The expected capitulation of fascist Italy in the fall of 1943 placed Albania before two possibilities. Firstly, the highly anticipated landing of the Allied forces could take place in Albania. Secondly, due to a military necessity to keep the South-eastern European Front under control, Germany could invade Albania.³ This did happen, as on September 9, 1943. The German invasion of Albania was carried out with military efficiency and faced no significant challenges, as there was initially neither substantial resistance from the Italians nor any hostile actions from the Albanian population. The commanding general of the XXI Mountain Army Corps, who was primarily responsible for the occupation, established his headquarters in Tirana. Two divisions were deployed on Albanian territory: the 297th Infantry Division in northern and central Albania and the 100th Jäger Division in the south.⁴

In this context, the two main Albanian political forces, the Communist Party and *Balli Kombëtar*, decided to sit down to discuss the war and the future of the country. This meeting took place in Mukja on August 1-3, 1943, after preliminary talks had been held a few days earlier in another nearby village, Tapiza. The decisions taken during this conference continue to influence Albanian political tendencies and scientific views today.

First, we will provide a summary of the political situation on the eve of the Mukja Meeting, including an analysis of the political forces' positions as well as a discussion of the conference's preparations. The author examines the involvement of German politics in this event for the first time, using documents extracted from the Political Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin.⁵ The relations between *Balli Kombëtar* and the Germans, before, during, and after the conference in Mukja, are of particular interest. As we will see below, the promises made to the Germans by this organization, to not fight them, long before the invasion of Albania, make *Balli Kombëtar's* promise in Mukja to fight the invaders more than doubtful.

¹ The Albanian royal army did not resist the invading forces. The most notable resistance against the Italian invasion took place in Durrës. Despite being insufficiently armed and facing severe shortages of ammunition, Albanian volunteer forces managed to delay the landing for several hours. The resistance was led by Major Abaz Kupi, a fact largely omitted in communist historiography, which instead attributed the organization of the defense to an Albanian army non-commissioned officer, Mujo Ulqinaku, who was killed in combat.

² Marenglen Kasmi, "The Albanian Resistance during the Second World War 1939–1944," in: *Anti-Axis Resistance in Southeastern Europe, 1939–1945: Forms and Varieties*, ed. John Paul Newman, Ljubinka Škodrić, Rade Ristanović (Paderborn: Brill Schöningh, 2023), 188–189.

³ Marenglen Kasmi, *Pushtimi gjerman i Shqipërisë 1943–1944. Një këndvështrim në dritën e dokumenteve gjermane* (Tiranë: Botime Filara, 2013), 53–60.

⁴ Marenglen Kasmi, *Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-gjermane në shekullin XX (1900–1945)* (Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave të Shqipërisë, 2020), 247–254; 312–314.

⁵ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA/AA).

The significance of Mukja for German politics will be discussed in depth, as will the reasons for the ending of this agreement.

Towards Mukja...

During the Italian occupation, *Balli Kombëtar* embraced an indecisive stance between resistance and cooperation with the Italians. Indeed, there were few *Balli Kombëtar* combat units engaged in fights against Italian invaders. However, these isolated attacks were not the result of a unified directive from the *Balli Kombëtar* leaders. *Balli Kombëtar* adopted a passive policy towards the Italian invader. In terms of internal political forces, the relationship between *Balli Kombëtar* and the Albanian Communist Party, before the capitulation of Italy in the summer of 1943, was hostile but limited to a fierce ideological struggle.⁶ *Balli Kombëtar* viewed the leadership of the Communist Party as dependent on the Yugoslav Communist Party. On the other hand, the Albanian communists considered *Balli Kombëtar* as outdated.

From March 17 to March 22, 1943, the First Conference of the Albanian Communist Party was held in Labinot. At this conference, Josip Broz Tito's representative, Blažo Jovanović, delivered new directives on behalf of the Comintern⁷, which were to be the political basis of the anti-fascist war for the Anti-fascist National Liberation Movement. Among other things, Josip Broz Tito's letter read: "[...] *The main task of the conference is to create a safe party leadership and take concrete decisions, such as: Organization of the liberation war against the Italian and German invaders; The formation and strengthening of Balli Kombëtar, composed of all Albanian patriots, who come from the cadres of the Albanian National Liberation Movement; During the partisan war, if possible, the honest nationalists and patriots should take the side of the communists.*"⁸

However, at this conference, the discussion focused on the organizational issues of the Anti-Fascist Liberation Movement rather than ideology.⁹ As a result, the creation of the National Liberation Army and the election of the Permanent Central Committee, led by Enver Hoxha as Secretary General, were two of the most important decisions made at this conference. In the same spirit, the Provisional General Council, which emerged from the Peza Conference and was composed of communists and nationalists, met again in Labinot on July 10, 1943, and elected the National Liberation Army General Staff, which consisted of 12 members. This Headquarters took command of the National Liberation Army.¹⁰

⁶ Bernd J. Fischer, *Shqipëria gjatë luftës 1939–1945* (Tiranë: Çabej 2004), 187.

⁷ Bernhard Tönnies, *Sonderfall Albanien: Enver Hoxhas "eigener Weg" und die historischen Ursprünge seiner Ideologie* (München: Oldenbourg 1980), 451. The Communist International (Comintern), also known as the Third International, was a political international which existed from 1919 to 1943 and advocated world communism.

⁸ Vladimir Dedijer, *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi* (Beograd: Borba 1949), 20–22.

⁹ B. Tönnies, *op. cit.*, 451.

¹⁰ Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste pranë KQ te PPSH, *Dokumente të Shtabit të Përgjithshëm dhe të Komandës së Përgjithshme të Ushtrisë Nacionalçlirimtare Shqiptare*, vëllimi I (Tiranë: 8 nëntori 1976), 9–20.

Furthermore, on July 9, the General Council of the National Liberation Movement decided to contact the *Balli Kombëtar* organization.¹¹ The idea was to merge the two organizations into one.¹² Bernd J. Fischer describes the reasons for this action, which occurred on the eve of Italy's surrender: "*Balli Kombëtar began to understand that its relative passivity could be followed by many disadvantages, especially given that the Italian military's actions did not harm the partisans as Balli Kombëtar had hoped. As a result, Balli Kombëtar changed tactics in June and July, distancing itself from the collaborationist government, strengthening its armed units, and developing tougher propaganda, though it appears that even this shift was not followed/accompanied by significant military activity.*"¹³

This appeared to be the best time for Balli Kombëtar to reach an agreement with *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*. Similarly, Enver Hoxha saw the opportunity to collaborate with *Balli Kombëtar* as very favorable, given that the Allies were expecting the opening of the Second Front in the Balkans, which at the time would be followed by their landing in Albania. The arrival of the allied forces in Albania would automatically strengthen *Balli Kombëtar*, which was ideologically similar to them. Furthermore, the British Mission in Albania put pressure on Albanians to fight together against the invaders. Nevertheless, it is essential to underscore that the British military mission in Albania did not play a pivotal role in orchestrating the negotiations between the two factions. Historian Roderick Bailey asserts that, although British officer Maclean, stationed at Enver Hoxha's headquarters, explicitly conveyed in Labinoti that Britain favored the unification of Albanian forces into a single front against Nazi-fascism, he was not directly engaged in the organization of the Mukje Conference.¹⁴

The weakening of the Italian war machine in the summer of 1943 was also clearly noticed among the Italian troops in Albania.¹⁵ According to German archival documents, the political situation in the summer of 1943 was increasingly tense, though there were brief periods of temporary calmness. Although the Italians had some military successes in the spring of 1943, such as the organization of the Albanian gendarmerie in April 1943, the German legate in Tirana concluded, that "*many Albanian nationalists still believe that only close cooperation with the Germans can resolve this dangerous situation. They also hoped to find an argument for this cooperation in order to counter the numerous defeatists, Anglo-Americans, and communists.*"¹⁶

In fact, Albanian nationalists' proclivity to approach or collaborate with the Germans predates 1943. German documents reveal a previously unknown meeting

¹¹ The Central Committee of Balli Kombëtar was composed of Mit'hat Frashëri (Chairman), Fuat Dibra, Faik Quku, Nuredin Vlora, Ali Këlcyra, Hasan Dosti, Kol Tromara, Skënder Muço, Abaz Ermenji, Kadri Cakrani, Koço Muka dhe Zef Pali. (M. Kasmî, *Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-gjermane*, 189).

¹² *Ibid*, 18.

¹³ B. J. Fischer, *op. cit.*, 205.

¹⁴ Roderick Bailey, *Lufta e fshehtë në Shqipëri. Një histori e misioneve britanike 1940–1945* (Tiranë: Naïmi 2019), 114–115.

¹⁵ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), Rom Quirinal, Bd.130. *Bericht: Lage in Albanien. Die italienische Besatzungarmee, vom 3. Mai 1943. (gez. Delius).*

¹⁶ *Ibid.* (See also PA/AA, Nachlass Dr. Martin Schliep, Erinnerungen).

on December 7, 1942, between Vehbi Frashëri¹⁷ and the German adviser on ethnic issues in the headquarters of the German General Commander in Serbia.¹⁸

In addition to Frashëri's request that their conversation be kept private, he presented to his interlocutor some Albanian nationalist positions after Italy's possible withdrawal from the war. According to Frashëri, signing a peace treaty with special terms between Italy and Germany's adversaries would increase England's influence in the Mediterranean. "As a result, or perhaps precisely because of this, Albanian nationalist circles still hoped that, with the help of Germany, [they] would overthrow the Italian rule," Vehbi Frashëri wrote. Vehbi went even further by saying: "In Albania, a number of small and armed detachments - about 20 in total - have been formed and are dispersed throughout the country, eagerly following the orders from the leadership of a secret Albanian nationalist organization. The leaders of this organization are ready to carry out whatever orders Germany gives them. They are waiting for the day when the roads of Germany and Italy will diverge."¹⁹

Of course, the German interlocutor, remaining loyal to the alliance with Italy, did not give Frashëri any hope of Germany intervening militarily in Albania at that time. He even took care not to give Vehbi any false hope about such a possibility.²⁰ This secret nationalist organization cannot be anything other than *Balli Kombëtar*. The above-mentioned document conveys two key messages. First, it provides additional information about *Balli Kombëtar*'s establishment. Since Vehbi Frashëri constantly referred to it as a secret organization, *Balli Kombëtar* could not have been established during that time, (early 1939), but rather in November 1942, as the majority of researchers, both local and foreign, believe. The formation of a political organization is, of course, a lengthy process. However, the claim that *Balli Kombëtar* was formed only after the Italian occupation of Albania does not have any credible basis. Second, and most importantly, the document states that the leaders of this organization, i.e. *Balli Kombëtar*, since the end of 1942, considered Albania's future intertwined with Germany rather than in alliance with Great Britain, i.e. the Anglo-Americans. This demonstrates not only *Balli Kombëtar*'s "political myopia" during the Second World War, but it is also indicative of *Balli Kombëtar*'s inconsistent policy. Cooperating with Germany at this time was a disastrous decision, if not outright political suicide. Their cooperation with the Germans after the invasion leaves no doubt that Vehbi Frashëri was indeed sent by *Balli Kombëtar* to this meeting.

As pointed out in the beginning of the study, the most discussed issue of the time was the landing of Allied troops in Albania or the occupation of Albania by German troops. A possibility, at least according to the nationalist forces, was also

¹⁷ He was the son of Mehdi Bey Frashëri, the chairman of the Albanian regency during the German occupation and a close associate of the Germans (*Vertrauensmann*). After the invasion of Albania by Germany, he served as the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the collaborationist government of Tirana.

¹⁸ PA/AA, Akten der deutschen Gesandtschaft Tirana, Innenpolitik Albaniens, Tirana 4/7, *Bericht des Bevollmächtigten des Auswärtigen Amtes beim Militärbefehlshaber in Serbien, Belgrad, 7. Dezember 1942.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

the seizure of power by the communists, who at that time were the most organized political force in the country. The pragmatic strategy of *Balli Kombëtar* which was based on not cooperating with the Italians but also on a passive military attitude towards them, did not prove effective, or at least not very productive, in strengthening this political camp. This fact, reinforced by the belief that the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* was the only group that actively fought against the Italian invaders until the summer of 1943, pushed *Balli Kombëtar* to accept the negotiations put forward by the British Military Mission in Albania, especially at that time when the landing of the Allied forces on the shores of Albania was a heavily debated strategic option. *Balli Kombëtar* tried to quickly transform itself, even though it was too late to become the main protagonist of the war against the Italian invaders.

Throughout the war, *Balli Kombëtar*'s official policy was characterized by opportunism. Their political orientation was based on balancing the relations with both the Allies and the Germans. *Balli Kombëtar* followed an "open door" policy. At this point, the greatest threat to *Balli Kombëtar* appeared in internal developments, specifically the strengthening of the Communist Party and the partisan army, rather than from the invaders. In the Meeting of Mukja, this organization attempted to neutralize this threat.

To pave the way for negotiations, *Balli Kombëtar* withdrew its support for the Albanian collaborationist government in the summer of 1943 and switched to openly distributing anti-government propaganda, while also strengthening *Balli Kombëtar* detachments.

The Communist Party was interested in collaborating with the nationalists to fight the invaders together. First, it should be noted that the Comintern wanted a united war on a single front against the Germans, and secondly, there was pressure applied by the British liaison officers, who insisted at all costs that Albanians cooperate on a single front.

The deep distrust between the Communist Party and *Balli Kombëtar* is what separated them. Schliep rightly wrote about Mukja that "*besides the common desire to fight against the Italian army, the Albanians generally cannot stand each other and are divided*".²¹ According to the Communist Party, *Balli Kombëtar* was a group of traitors who had boycotted the war against the Italian invaders and even made agreements with them, such as the Dalmazzo-Këlcyra agreement in March 1943.²² On the other hand, *Balli Kombëtar* thought the war was nothing more than a tool for the communists to gain power.

²¹ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), R 27772, *Telegramm nr. 4193, von Bismarck (Rom) nach Berlin, 23. August 1943, 0.10 Uhr.*

²² Agreement between *Balli Kombëtar*, represented by Ali Këlcyra, and General Lorenzo (Renzo) Dalmazzo, Commander of the Italian VI Army Corps located in Tirana. This agreement is known as the "Protocollo Dalmazzo-Këlcyra." According to this agreement, the Italian Command promised to give all possible assistance to the *Balli Kombëtar* organization and its armed units. In this way, the use of all roads of communication was assured for the Italian troops against any attack by the National Forces of Liberation. (For more, see Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste, *Historia e Luftës Antifashiste Nacionalçlirimtare të popullit shqiptar*, vëllimi I (Tiranë: 8 nëntori 1984); Coltrinari, Massimo, *La Resistenza dei militari italiani all'estero: L'Albania* (Roma: Ministero della difesa, 1999); Gjeçovi, Xhelal, *Çështje të Luftës Antifashiste Nacionalçlirimtare. Gjykimi mbi luftën pas shtatëdhjetë vjetësh* (Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, 2014).

Until the summer of 1943, *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, led by the Communist Party, was the only group that had fought actively and in an organized manner against the Italian invaders, mainly in Southern and Central Albania. However, there were also *Balli Kombëtar* units that had carried out some attacks against the Italian army. These attacks were only triggered by the anti-fascist attitudes of a few local leaders of these groups and they were not the organization's official stance towards the Italian invaders. This is proven by the fact that the leadership of Balli Kombëtar lived freely in Tirana and would spend their days sitting in the most popular cafés.

With the global strategic shifts, all Albanian political forces were compelled to reassess their positions. Consequently, *Balli Kombëtar* initiated negotiations with the opposing side. As previously mentioned, this organization leveraged the few local attacks conducted by some *Balli Kombëtar* units as a way to start negotiations. Abas Kupa²³ acted as the parties' negotiator, so it can be said that both sides were ready to engage in a discussion. The British Mission in Albania also advocated for Albanians to unite in their fight against the invaders.²⁴

The delegation of the National Liberation General Council, which decided to form a political-military alliance with *Balli Kombëtar* on July 9, 1943, extended the official invitation to the meeting. This Council formally invited the *Balli Kombëtar* organization to a meeting through this letter, urging them to convene as soon as possible.²⁵ According to the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, more specifically the Communist Party, the meeting was intended to discuss how *Balli Kombëtar* could join *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* to reinforce organized resistance against the Italian occupier.

In this context, the delegations of the two organizations met in Tapiza on Monday, July 26, 1943. Despite the meeting being called through writing, *Balli Kombëtar* responded verbally, confirming the participation of its delegation.²⁶ The parties reached an agreement at the Tapiza meeting, and in conclusion, the following points were signed: a) Declare an immediate war against the fascist invaders. b) Both organizations agree on the concept of establishing a joint committee called the "Committee of National Salvation of Albania." c) Fight for a free, independent, and democratic Albania. c) The committee also fights for the liberation of Albania within the borders recognized internationally in 1913, as well as for the other areas inhab-

²³ Abaz Kupa was a prominent Albanian nationalist figure during World War II. Initially, he collaborated with the National Liberation Front in the struggle against the Italian occupation. Following the collapse of the Mukje Agreement and the subsequent entry of German forces into Albania, Kupa and his organization, Legality, initially adopted a neutral stance. However, during the final phase of the German occupation, Kupa engaged in collaboration with the German forces, assuming responsibility for securing the Wehrmacht's retreat routes between Tirana and Shkodra. (Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv (BA/MA) RH 19XI/ 37b, *Fernschreiben, Pz. AOK 2, IC/AO, 2.9.1944*).

²⁴ Xh. Gjeçovi, *op. cit.*, 71-72.

²⁵ Muharrem Dezhgiu, *Shqipëria nën pushtimin italian 1939–1943* (Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, 2005), 281.

²⁶ Ndreçi Plasari, Luan Malltezi, *Politika antikombëtare e Enver Hoxhës, Pleniumi i dytë i KQ të PKSh* (Tiranë: Drejtoria e Përgjithshme e Arkivave, 1996), 212; Letter from Ymer Dishnica to Enver Hoxha regarding the meeting of the National Liberation Front and Balli Kombëtar delegations in Tapiza, on July 26, 1943.

ited by Albanians, where it advocates the universal right of self-determination, guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter.²⁷

The final meeting was scheduled for the following day, July 27. According to Ymer Dishnica, one of the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*'s representatives, details were not discussed in Tapiza, but the contradictions between both parties became clear during the conversation.²⁸

The Tapiza meeting is also mentioned in German documents. On August 15, 1943, a report was written for the General Commander in the South East (*OB Südost*) in Belgrade. In general, this document not only confirms other sources as true, but it also provides some other important details about the kind of talks and plans for the future of Albania. According to this document, in Tapiza there were also talks about the creation of a government after the withdrawal of the Italian army.²⁹

Most likely, this perspective reflects internal discussions about political plans among *Balli Kombëtar* participants. This document, however, remains an indicator of the spirit of the talks, the conclusion of which differs little in substance from what is stated in it. According to what is written, the Communist Party was not included in the leadership structure. Even the Zogists were limited to military rather than political positions. Meanwhile, *Balli Kombëtar* always had the key political positions, which basically shows a subtle game that the *Balli Kombëtar* leaders managed to play in this meeting.

The parties' final meeting took place in Mukja on August 1-2, 1943, despite the fact that it was initially scheduled for Tapiza on July 27. The Italians had learned about the meeting and had deployed troops to surround the area.

Thoma Orollogaj, a representative for *Balli Kombëtar*, was appointed to chair the meeting. Mustafa Gjinishi, a representative for the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, was elected as secretary. The delegates from both sides agreed in principle to continue the war against the foreign invaders, approving the formation of the Committee of National Salvation of Albania, which would have 12 members, six from each party. One of the key points of the agreement was that the war would be fought for an independent Albania and the implementation of the principle of self-determination, universally recognized and guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter, for an ethnic, free, democratic, and popular Albania. Furthermore, after the war, the people would determine the form of government as well as the political force that would lead the country.³⁰

Mukja and its importance for German politics

On August 2, 1943, while the parties were still negotiating in Mukja, the German embassy in Rome sent a report to Berlin, in which consul Schliep stated, among other things, that “*the internal situation is characterized by the formation of*

²⁷ Kristo Frashëri, *Mbi historinë e Ballit Kombëtar. Vështrim kritik* (Tiranë: Botimet Dudaj, 2012), 80–90.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv (BA/MA), RH 26-100/46, *1c Nr. 200/43 geh., 100. Jäger-Division an KDR. Gen. u. Bfh. in Serbien, 1c Belgrad, O.U., 15.8.1943.*

³⁰ Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, *Historia e popullit shqiptar, vëllimi IV* (Tiranë: Botimet Toena, 2008), 67–71; K. Frashëri, *op. cit.*, 81–89; Paskal Milo, *Antifashizmi shqiptar në Luftën e Dytë Botërore* (Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, 2024), 276–286.

*an Organization for the National Liberation of Albania, as it is called in the proclamation and has unwavering faith in the sincerity of the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance, which fights against the Axis for an independent and democratic Albania. In charge is a General Council, which includes three communists as well as the well-known leaders of a few paramilitary units, Abaz Kupa and Myslim Peza. In addition, a 'General Staff of the National Liberation Army' has been established with the goal of unifying the direction and activating the guerilla war, the details of which we do not yet know [...]*³¹

As we see, consul Schliep was well-informed. Schliep discusses the contents of the proclamation drawn up in Mukja, which, as we read above, he refers to as a proclamation as well. As previously stated, the Mukja proclamation would be published following the end of the talks in Mukja. The intensity and accuracy of the report logically leads to the conclusion that this information is most likely from a first-hand source, meaning a participant in the talks.

Furthermore, a few days later, on August 23, Schliep reported to Berlin that *"the Organization for the National Liberation of Albania cannot be considered cooperative because it contains a strong communist element that maintains ties with the enemy. Despite having joined the organization, Balli Kombëtar has informed me that it will fight only the Italians and not the Germans. The guerilla's leader, Abas Kupa (Bazit Cani), is expected to take the same position"*.³²

According to the text, of all the participants in Mukja, the communists were the only ones who did not meet requirements to cooperate with the Germans. Because of all the reasons mentioned above, *Balli Kombëtar* declared that, while it was not yet ready to openly cooperate, it would not fight against the Germans. Thus, *Balli Kombëtar's* decision in Mukja to fight any invaders³³ contradicts what they had promised the German consul Schliep behind closed doors.

As previously stated, *Balli Kombëtar's* attitude towards the German invaders was ambiguous. This is further highlighted by their subsequent actions. It is concluded that *Balli Kombëtar* approached Mukja with open intentions, maintaining relations with both the British and the Germans. The Germans, of course, showed interest as well. The *Balli Kombëtar* leadership prepared the agenda for the talks. Therefore, the documents cited above strongly suggest that *Balli Kombëtar* was, at the very least, involved in giving information to the German consul.

If the agreements reached during the meeting had been implemented and *Balli Kombëtar* had been in charge of the war, it is difficult to believe that the Committee that emerged from Mukja would have fought against the Germans. Schliep reported on the formation of a counter-government emerging from the Committee,

³¹ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), Büro des Staatssekretärs, Akten betreffend Albanien, *Telegramm nr. 3736, (Sonder-G-Schreiber) von Mackensen (Rom) nach Berlin, 2. August 1943, 18.00 Uhr.*

³² Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), R 27772, *Telegramm nr. 4193, von Bismarck (Rom) nach Berlin, 23. August 1943, 0.10 Uhr.*

³³ Arkivi Qëndror i Shtetit (AQSH), Fondi 14, V.1943, D. 31, Fl. 9. *Procesverbal i mbledhjes së delegacioneve të Ballit Kombëtar dhe Nacionalçlirimtares në katundin Mukje, 1 gusht 1943.*

as this was their goal.³⁴ According to the plan, the communist element in this government would be insignificant. *Balli Kombëtar* almost certainly would still have collaborated with the Germans, but as a governmental fighting formation instead of a non-governmental one. This turned out to be not just an idle speculation, but a true occurrence. Similarly, if the Allies had landed and found *Balli Kombëtar* at the forefront of the war, any dealings with Germans, known or unknown, would have become completely irrelevant.

When *Balli Kombëtar* realized that the landing was not going to take place, they openly cooperated with the Germans. The failure of Mukja was, and continues to be, the justification for this action. Mukja outlined the policy for Germany's occupation.³⁵

Reasons for breaking the agreement

The position of the Albanian Communist Party would be severely harmed if a new organization based on the Mukja agreement were to emerge. It would automatically become the country's second political force, despite being more organized, more advanced and already having more support from the people than *Balli Kombëtar*. The Communist Party was clearly the political force leading the resistance against the occupiers. The Provisional Executive Committee established in Mukja had to take the lead in the war against the foreign invaders, even though the Communist Party had already initiated organized resistance against the Italian invaders on September 16, 1942, at the Peza Conference. Moreover, the Communist Party was not adequately represented in the Provisional Executive Committee. The Provisional Committee, which was political in nature, was almost entirely made up of *Balli Kombëtar* members, nationalists, and supporters of King Zog. Even Abaz Kupi and Myslim Peza, who had absolutely no communist convictions, were elected from the ranks of the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* as members of the Provisional Committee. The positions they had, with Abaz Kupi as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces and Myslim Peza as Commander-in-Chief of the operational forces of the Tirana region, were military in nature and thus lacked political strength. This was unacceptable to the Albanian Communist Party, which was leading the active resistance at the time. Not only was the Albanian Communist Party overshadowed, but its role in leading the war was also weakening, reducing its chances of taking over the country's leadership.

The most important detail was that in Mukja, there were no discussions about the future of the National Liberation Councils established in Peza on September 16, 1942, which were at the core of *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*. These councils had proven to be very supportive in the war against the Italian invaders. Based on the newly reached agreements, they would not be part of the Provisional Committee, as new structures were going to be created. This meant that the resistance orga-

³⁴ Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv (BA/MA), RH 26-100/46, Ic Nr. 200/43 geh., 100. Jäger-Division an KDR. Gen. u. Bfh. in Serbien, Ic Belgrad, O.U., 15.8.1943.

³⁵ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), Büro des Staatssekretärs, Akten betreffend Albanien, Telegramm nr. 1250, Ribbentrop an Schliep, Sonderzug, den 21. August 1943, 2.05 Uhr.

nized by the conference in Peza, *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, and the Communist Party up to that point, was completely ignored.

“*The Provisional Committee for the Salvation of Albania accepted the responsibility assigned to it by the Mukja Agreement and decided to designate itself as the leading committee of the war against the Italian invaders. Abaz Kupi was given the role of commander until the joint headquarters were established*” writes Uran Butka.³⁶ This agreement nullified any political-military organization up to that point and claimed to bring a new organization to the forefront of the war, thereby rejecting everything that was already established in Peza. Meanwhile, the purpose of the meeting in Mukja was to negotiate for *Balli Kombëtar* to join the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* in order to fight against the invaders together.

During the negotiations, the representatives of *Balli Kombëtar* dominated every discussion. The agreement on the creation of the Provisional Committee was a success for *Balli Kombëtar*. Regardless of how paradoxical this compromise was for the communists, the reasons for the communist representatives’ persuasion can be attributed to the good negotiating skills of Mit’hat Frashëri and the argumentative strength of the “scholastic lawyer” Hasan Dosti, which even Enver Hoxha himself acknowledged.³⁷

As a result of *Balli Kombëtar* emerging as the main beneficiary from this agreement, just a few days later, the Communist Party denounced it and declared the signed agreements as having no value, thus widening the division between Albanians.

According to Albanian historiography from the early 1990s, the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* delegates, Mustafa Gjinishi and Ymer Dishnica, did not act in line with the Party’s stance and signed the agreement without the knowledge of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Even Enver Hoxha mentions the communication between the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its delegates, Gjinishi and Dishnica³⁸, as a problem. In this context, Mukja’s decisions can be viewed as a draft agreement that still needed approval from the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* (Albanian Communist Party), whose leaders were not in attendance. The General National Liberation Council had only instructed its delegates on what factors they should consider when drafting the agreement.³⁹ Furthermore, the delegates were not authorized to sign the agreement.⁴⁰

An agreement is said to be reached when both parties are aligned on every term. How could the Communist Party consider the agreement acceptable when it would have to lose everything it had achieved up to that point against the Italian invaders, both politically and militarily?

We should also keep in mind the ideological and social divide that existed between the representatives of the two parties. While *Balli Kombëtar* was represented

³⁶ Uran Butka, *Marrëveshja e Mukjas. Shans i Bashkimit, peng i tradhtisë* (Tiranë: Instituti i Studimeve Historike “Lumo Skëndo” 2018), 87–88.

³⁷ Enver Hoxha, *Vepra 1, nëntor 1941 - tetor 1943* (Tiranë: 8 nëntori 1983), 419–427; Enver Hoxha’s letter to Ymer Dishnica in response to the information letters for the Mukja Meeting, dated August 6, 1943.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ U. Butka, *op. cit.*, 45.

⁴⁰ E. Hoxha, *op. cit.*, 419–427.

by its most prominent members, Enver Hoxha did not even attend this meeting. His absence from the most significant political discussion of the time can only be described as an underestimation of this meeting, which he considered to be just a negotiation. Furthermore, if something was not to his liking, he could easily withdraw from the negotiations by accusing the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* delegates of deviating from the main concerns of the war, as indeed happened. The official reason given at the time for his absence from the meeting was that the 1st Partisan Brigade was being established in Vithkuqi of Korça.

Yugoslav historiography and some Albanian historians' writings after the 1990s, suggest that Enver Hoxha and the Central Committee of Albanian Communist Party actually agreed with the decisions of the Mukja Conference but had to reject them due to Yugoslav pressure.⁴¹ This was because *Balli Kombëtar* demanded the union of Albania and Kosovo. It is understandable that the Yugoslav Communist Party could not approve decisions that risked excluding Kosovo from the Yugoslav borders after the war, but this cannot be the primary reason for the agreement's failure. The decision in Mukja was made in favor of "the universal right of self-determination, guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter."⁴² This was not a new concept in Albania, but it was the one that the Allies had been emphasizing the most. Even Enver Hoxha himself, speaking at the Labinot Conference from November 4 to November 9, 1943, expressed the same view on the future of Kosovo as the *Balli Kombëtar* did in Mukja, namely that it should be a part of Albania.⁴³ However, compliance with the Atlantic Charter would be required, and this issue would need to be resolved after the war, in accordance with the principle of self-determination. On August 6, Enver Hoxha gave the following instructions to Ymer Dishnica: "We will be the only ones to declare independence without combating and subduing fascism, and this is what *Balli Kombëtar* puts on the table. They are the ones who have not fired a single bullet against the enemy and do not appear nor intend to fire any bullets in the near future. [...] Cordell Hull himself has stated that the Albanian people are one thing, and fascist traitors are another [...]."⁴⁴

Contrary to the preceding thesis, Harry Fultz, an expert on Albania, concludes, "When it became clear that *Balli Kombëtar* might be able to work with the Germans, they were probably looking for a reason to break the agreement. As a result, Hoxha's position not only benefited *Balli Kombëtar* but also gained some political capital. At the end of the day, *Balli Kombëtar* could not be held responsible for breaching the agreement."

⁴¹ Vladimir Dedijer, *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi 1939–1948* (Beograd: Borba 1949), 93–94; Nicholas C. Pano, *The people's Republic of Albania* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968), 51–55; U. Butka, *op. cit.*, 119–131; Akademia e Studimeve Albanologjike, Instituti i Historisë, *Historia e shqiptarëve gjatë shekullit XX, vëllimi IV* (Tiranë: Botimet albanologjike 2022), 181–194.

⁴² Stephanie Seul, "Europa im Wettstreit der Propagandisten: Entwürfe für ein besseres Nachkriegseuropa in der britischen Deutschlandpropaganda als Antwort auf Hitlers «Neuordnung Europas», *Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte*, no. 8, (2006), 139.

⁴³ Ndreçi Plasari, "Politika e udhëheqjes së PKSH dhe e Enver Hoxhës ndaj çështjes së Kosovës gjatë Luftës së dytë Botërore", *Studime historike*, XLVI (XXIX), 1–4, (1992), 81.

⁴⁴ E. Hoxha, *op. cit.*, 419–427.

Without ever questioning the patriotism and national sentiment of the *Balli Kombëtar* representatives, as well as their desire for a democratic future for Albania, the discussions about the ethnic union of Albanians in Mukja can be viewed as an argument to convince Albanians about the seriousness of the situation and the fact that *Balli Kombëtar*, albeit too late, was fighting against the invaders. Many nationalists, including those who later became leaders of *Balli Kombëtar*, opposed and rejected the decisions of the Conference of Peza. The nationalist elite not participating in the Peza Conference on September 16, 1942, can be regarded as the first failure of Albanians to unite against the invader on a single front. Of course, *Balli Kombëtar* cannot be held responsible for this as it had not yet been established as an organization, despite their claims to the contrary. If there had been a stronger nationalist presence in Peza, it would have made it more challenging for the Communist Party to gradually suppress the nationalist influence in the *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, and it would have made it more difficult for them to come to power after the war. The phlegmatic approach of the nationalists in Peza facilitated the establishment of communism in Albania. Who supported communists at the time, especially in a country where communism as an ideology was not yet recognized? Time proved that the Communist Party, with the help of nationalists such as Myslim Peza, Abaz Kupi, Haxhi Lleshi, and others, by using the fight against the invaders and the union as a leitmotif, managed to gain the support of a large portion of the population.

In light of the political and military developments both inside and outside of Albania, *Balli Kombëtar* realized that its isolated position was detrimental. So, it made an effort to unite, or at least create the impression that it was ready to cooperate with the communists for the sake of the country. It's hard to believe that *Balli Kombëtar* truly thought the Communist Party would make such discriminatory decisions against itself. However, if the agreement were to be broken, the communists would be to blame, especially when a major aspiration such as ethnic unification was at stake. The situation created the impression of a subtle political game rather than a genuine desire for unity. If the deal were to go through, *Balli Kombëtar* would take command of the war. If not, their actions would be justified, as it is still being interpreted today.

In order to gain political advantage, *Balli Kombëtar* needed to broaden the scope of the war in Mukja and garner national support. The ethnic union was intended to make the distinction in Mukja. They hoped that by doing so, they would garner more public support than the Communist Party. The rallying cry alone was insufficient. For a significant number of Albanians, the war had already begun. Now more than ever, *Balli Kombëtar* needed to reclaim its position as the country's primary political and military force. It is hard to believe that the leader of *Balli Kombëtar*, Mit'hat Frashëri, was unaware of the path that would lead to Albanian unification and who would ultimately decide on this unification. He was residing in London and Paris during the time of the decisions made in 1913 and 1920.

The discussion of the historical logic concludes here, and the causes and consequences of this failure need to be examined. All claims made by *Balli Kombëtar* during the war, and by its supporters today for ending this already "broken agreement", are used to justify their political failure during the largest global conflict of the twentieth century.

Enver Hoxha was the one who officially broke the agreement. Also, it is undeniable that Enver Hoxha had the desire to be in power alone after the war. However, attributing the failure of the cooperation between Albanians solely to him does not entirely correspond with reality. The assumption that *Balli Kombëtar* was compelled to cooperate with the Germans due to the start of the civil war following the agreement's ending in Mukja is highly dubious and contentious. *Balli Kombëtar* had sought cooperation with the Germans since the end of 1942, as proven by the German documents cited above. The option to fight alone or with the help of the Allies was always available. If it had happened, Enver Hoxha would have had a difficult time dealing with them. There are numerous other examples in Europe where ideological opponents fought the occupier on their own. Figuratively, the failure of Mukja can be likened to the echo or shock wave of an explosive with a pre-programmed detonation. The fuse that sabotaged Albanian cooperation was lit by Enver Hoxha, but the explosive charge was delivered by *Balli Kombëtar*!

Historically, *Balli Kombëtar* was as power-hungry as the Communist Party was. However, they took different paths in order to gain power. The Communist Party used the fight against the occupier as its rallying cry. In fact, its slogan was “*Death to Fascism - Freedom to the People*,” while *Balli Kombëtar*'s slogan was “*Albania of Albanians - Death to traitors*.” Logically, the traitors according to *Balli Kombëtar* were those fighting against the Nazi fascist invaders, i.e., the majority of Albanians. Under the guise of the communist threat, *Balli Kombëtar* did not hesitate to join the German invaders. No one could predict what would happen after the war, especially in Albania. While *Balli Kombëtar* declared its support for democratic values, it was exploited by an anti-democratic country, such as the Third Reich. As a result, to gain power after the war, *Balli Kombëtar* first had to eliminate the communist rivals, who had already gained popularity. What was not accomplished at the negotiation table in Mukja would be attempted by using German weapons and fighting alongside them against the partisans.

As previously stated, *Balli Kombëtar* and the Communist Party shared the same concern regarding who would be in power after the war. The widely held belief today that *Balli Kombëtar* was only interested in the form of government and not in gaining power is incorrect and illogical.⁴⁵ A political force works in order to gain power, as it did in the past and still does today.

Despite the fact that the Albanian Communist Party did not accept the Mukja Agreement, *Balli Kombëtar* still had the option of waging war against the German invaders. This could be done without cooperating with *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, but instead with other non-communist groups, as well as with the support of the British. During the war, *Balli Kombëtar* was the only Albanian political force that did not have an Allied Mission officially assigned to it. This was primarily because the Allies viewed *Balli Kombëtar* as a collaborator with the Germans.

Secondly, and more importantly, *Balli Kombëtar* failed to establish a well-structured political-military organization, as it did not develop a coherent institutional framework in either political or military terms. One potential explanation for

⁴⁵ Akademia e Studimeve Albanologjike, *op. cit.*, 181–194.

this limitation was its association with German forces. By maintaining an intentionally decentralized structure, the leadership of *Balli Kombëtar* sought to mitigate direct accusations of formal collaboration with the German occupiers.

By the end of 1943, despite the warning from the British about the political consequences of their strategy, the members of *Balli Kombëtar* saw cooperation as the safest and most comfortable way to halt the growth of the communist movement. This strategy aided the Communist Party in unmasking *Balli Kombëtar* to the people and later destroying it both politically and physically.

The Leaders of *Balli Kombëtar* failed to notice the signs and opted for comfort over war. From this perspective, Mukja was destined to fail from the start. The ethnic issue was not the main obstacle. Even if the ethnic issue had been left unaddressed in Mukja, the cooperation would not have been successful, especially not under the Mukja platform.

Despite the stance of *Balli Kombëtar*, the Communist Party shares equal responsibility in this narrative. Although the agreement points put forward were unacceptable to them, they did not express a willingness to revisit them. Enver Hoxha himself conceded at the Berati Plenum in November 1944 that *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, or in fact the Communist Party, made a mistake in terminating this agreement prematurely.⁴⁶

As previously stated, it would have been more appropriate for the Albanian Communist Party to resume meetings with *Balli Kombëtar*. However, they should have done so with better representation. The aim was to persuade *Balli Kombëtar* to join *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, which was the original intent of this meeting. Enver Hoxha would assert, “*In this case, even if we did not agree with Balli Kombëtar, we would be justified in front of the people*”.⁴⁷

Enver Hoxha’s self-critique in Berat demonstrates, among other things, that cooperation with the anti-fascist wing of the *Balli Kombëtar* was welcomed. Their willingness to fight the invaders was also appreciated.

From September 4-9, 1943, another *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* Conference took place in Labinot. The primary goal of this conference was to condemn and break the Mukja Agreement. The delegates of this conference expressed their condemnation of the Mukja agreement and pledged to continue the war, basing their efforts on the Peza platform.⁴⁸ Although Abaz Kupa did not attend the conference, he stated that he would agree with any decisions made there. His absence can be explained as a tactical move, as a few days later, on September 18, 1943, he founded the Zogist National Party, also known as the Legality Party.⁴⁹

The establishment of the Legality Party marked the full establishment of Albania’s political-military forces during the war. Mukja served as the official manifestation of the divide that had formed between the two parties.

⁴⁶ N. Plasari; L. Malltezi, *op. cit.*, 24.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ B. Tönnes, *op. cit.*, 455–456.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

The agreement of Mukja was deemed unacceptable by the Communist Party. This happened as a result of many factors that ultimately caused it to end: mutual distrust and non-acceptance, the exclusion of *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* in the Mukja platform, trying to take charge of the command during the war, *Balli Kombëtar*'s passive combative stance towards the Italian occupier, and even more so towards the new German occupier. Other contributing factors included the Communist Party's lack of negotiating experience, the undeniable influence of the Yugoslav emissaries who were categorically against any Albanian union that could threaten their interests, and most importantly, the intense desire of both parties to seize power during and after the war.

When talking about the Yugoslav influence at the time, logic suggests that Enver Hoxha did not need orders from the Yugoslavs to break an agreement that was unfavorable to him. Even without them, the agreement, in the form and with the content that it was put forward, was not of interest to him or the Communist Party. The main reasons for this have been stated above.

The ending of this important agreement between the parties under the guise of Albanian nationalism has been and continues to remain anti-historical and is rather a product of nationalist propaganda, but also of German propaganda, to present the Communist Party as an anti-Albanian party in the service of foreigners. The echo of this propaganda is still partially influencing the public opinion today.

The ending of the Mukja agreement by the Communist Party does not relieve *Balli Kombëtar* of its political and military failures. Ultimately, it was the responsibility of this experienced political and social elite to have a broader vision than the newly emerged, uneducated or partially educated communists. As previously mentioned, the Mukja Agreement was essentially dead from the beginning.

Balli Kombëtar attended Mukja not with the intention to cooperate with *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar*, but to seize control of the war. They presented a well-thought-out political platform that offered options to both the Allies and Hitler's Germany. The leaders of *Balli Kombëtar* hoped that if the agreement failed, they could use nationalist influence within *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* to weaken the communist stance within the anti-fascist resistance. This would transform *Balli Kombëtar* into a significant political-military force. Both the Communist Party and *Balli Kombëtar* aimed to seize power after the war and were determined to eliminate their political and ideological opponents at any cost.⁵⁰ The Communist Party

⁵⁰ With the Italian invasion of Albania, the country's sovereignty was effectively suspended. The formation of a modern Albanian state can be traced to the Congress of Lushnjë in January 1920, which established the first national government. From that moment until April 7, 1939, Albanian politics were dominated by Ahmet Zogu. Zogu held key leadership roles, serving as Prime Minister (1922–1924), President (1925–1928), and ultimately as King (1928–1939). His tenure was characterized by efforts to centralize power, strengthen state institutions, and suppress political opposition, including the June Revolution of 1924, which briefly forced him into exile. With the support of Yugoslavia, he regained control, proclaimed Albania a republic in 1925, and assumed

understood that fighting the occupier and their collaborators would pave the way for its rise to power. On the other hand, *Balli Kombëtar* pursued a strategy of collaborating with the Germans to destroy their political opponent, using its “victimization” by the other party as propaganda. The war waged by *Balli Kombëtar* military units in collaboration with the Germans to destroy the partisan army clearly indicates this strategy. The disagreement in Mukja demonstrated that it was too late for the Albanians to find a common ground, and their unification was no longer a topic of discussion. If the agreement attempt failed, the other party would be held liable. On the surface, this is the only accurate prediction of *Balli Kombëtar*, as the agreement was broken by the Communist Party. The reason for this must first be found in the social divide that had developed between the parties, as well as in their perceptions of post-war Albania.

the presidency with broad executive powers. In 1928, he declared Albania a monarchy, assuming the title King Zog I, and implemented reforms aimed at state consolidation and modernization. However, increasing political, economic, and military dependence on Italy progressively undermined Albania’s sovereignty, culminating in the Italian invasion of 1939. Following this event, Zog was forced into exile and never regained power.

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ALBANIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR:
THE AGREEMENT OF MUKJA BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS
AND THE NATIONALISTS

Marenglen Kasmi, PhD*

Summary

The disagreement of the two main political-military forces in Albania during the Second World War, between *Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar* (National Liberation Front), more precisely the Communist Party and *Balli Kombëtar* (National Front), at the Mukja meeting on August 1-2, 1943, to join in the war against the Nazi-fascist invaders led to their final separation. The attempt of *Balli Kombëtar* to take control of the war in Mukja from the hands of the communists is the main reason for the ending of this agreement. The struggle for power and the ideological differences between them became even more evident after the German occupation of Albania in September 1943. While the Communist Party perfected the organization of the partisan army and continued the fight against the invaders, *Balli Kombëtar* joined the German invaders. Their combat formations fought alongside the German troops against the partisan army, while also burning houses, looting, attacking and arresting parts of the population that were supporters of the partisans. The leaders of *Balli Kombëtar* hoped to eliminate the communists and the partisan army by using German power. By cooperating with the German invaders, *Balli Kombëtar* was discredited in the eyes of the Albanian people as well as the Allies and they lost the legitimacy to participate in the country's first democratic elections after the war. Consequently, in the elections of 1945, the Albanian people had no alternative but the Democratic Front, dominated by the communists. The establishment of communism in Albania was inevitable. Anti-fascism and the fight against the invaders led by the Communist Party, intertwined with the spectacular political failure of the anti-communist nationalists during the war, set the foundation of communism in Albania. It is paradoxical, but the political myopia of the anti-communist nationalists was the greatest advantage that Enver Hoxha had, in order to be in power after the war.

KEYWORDS: Albania, Second World War, German Occupation, Albanian Communist Party, Enver Hoxha, Fronti Nacionalçlirimtar, Balli Kombëtar, Agreement of Mukja

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