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DEVELOPMENT OF AIR TRANSPORT BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1945-1992

ABSTRACT: Yugoslavia and the United States achieved very broad cooperation in the field of air transport. Three phases in its development can be observed, as well as several different but interrelated aspects: diplomatic activity, airline services, aircraft purchases, personnel training. The paper is based on archival and memoir material, published sources, press and literature.

KEYWORDS: Yugoslavia, USA, Aviation, Air Transport, Yugoslav Airlines (JAT), Inex-Adria Airways (IAA), Pan American World Airways (Pan Am)

Although it is mostly connected with the period from 1970 to 1992, when Yugoslav Airlines (Jugoslovenski aerotransport, JAT) operated flights between the two countries, air transport between Yugoslavia and the United States of America has a much longer prehistory and can be viewed as an indicator of the general state of Yugoslav-American relations during the 20th century.

First phase: initial contacts, the first agreement and first services (1945-1963)

An oral agreement between Yugoslav and Allied authorities was reached at the end of 1944, granting the right to British and American air forces to set up and operate navigation and communication aides at Belgrade airport. It was also agreed that these aides would be given to Yugoslavia free of charge once Yugoslav personnel was trained to operate them. Besides this, the American embassy in Belgrade was given the right to station an airplane at the airport for the needs of its air attaché. The British embassy was given the same right and operated two aircraft. In March 1946, Yugoslav authorities decided to pursue the matter of withdrawal of all American and British personnel from Belgrade airport, as well as taking over the mentioned navigation and communication aides. They reasoned that Yugoslav personnel became capable of operating and maintaining the aides

and aircraft by late 1945. Another argument was that American and British radio stations were needed to transmit coded messages during the war and that they were no longer necessary as communication was now being done according to international civilian regulations. The American embassy was notified of this by the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on April 2nd, 1946. In its reply, dated, April 25th, the embassy stated that it accepted Yugoslav arguments about the need to perform air operations according to peacetime rules. It declared that retaining its airplane at Belgrade was of critical importance for the embassy, as well as for the American elements of the Allied Control Commissions in Hungary and Romania. It also stated that there was still a need to further train Yugoslav personnel in the use of navigation aides and that the United States were still willing to provide necessary training.¹

Soon, the question of the American airplane at Belgrade airport was raised again. On May 24th, 1946, Yugoslav MFA notified the American embassy in Belgrade that it wouldn't be able to use its own airplane on Yugoslav territory beginning with June 1st and that it could use regular Yugoslav air transport. The same deadline was given for the withdrawal of American servicemen from Belgrade airport. The embassy only received this note on May 27th and replied on June 4th. It strongly disagreed with the Yugoslav request, stating that the date was set without any consideration of the embassy's needs and without proper replacement in the form of a regular civilian air service. The embassy also declared that a solution to this problem could be found in the spirit of positive cooperation between the two countries, citing the example of aid provided to Yugoslavia by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The MFA of Yugoslavia only responded on July 4th. It declared that there are serious obstacles to solving the question of air transport for the needs of the American embassy in Belgrade. These were the unauthorized flights by American military transport aircraft over north-western Yugoslavia, America's procrastination in returning Yugoslav merchant ships and riverine vessels to the country and the question of Yugoslav rail traffic through the American and British occupation zones in Germany and Austria.²

It seems that the American airplane and personnel were really withdrawn from Belgrade. On June 25th, 1946, the American embassy in Belgrade asked for permission for flights between Belgrade and Vienna (every day except Sunday) and between Vienna, Belgrade and Bucharest (arrival from Vienna on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays and return from Bucharest on the next day) for a period of thirty days. The request also stated that Douglas C-47 aircraft would be used, and a list of aircrew members was attached for the purpose of

¹ Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije (DA MSP), fond Politička arhiva (PA), 1946, Međunarodni vazdušni saobraćaj (MVS), fascikla (f.) 77, pov. br. 2760, dopis Generalštaba Jugoslovenske armije MIP FNRJ, 14. 3. 1946 i nota MIP FNRJ Ambasadi SAD u Beogradu, 2. 4. 1946; Ibid., pov. br. 4821, nota Ambasade SAD u Beogradu MIP FNRJ, 25. 4. 1946.

² Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), fond 836, Kancelarija Maršala Jugoslavije, I-3-b/750, nota MIP FNRJ Ambasadi SAD u Beogradu br. 5772, 24. 5. 1946; Ibid., nota Ambasade SAD u Beogradu, 4. 6. 1946 i odgovor MIP FNRJ, 4. 7. 1946 (Isto u: DA MSP, PA, 1946, MVS, f. 77, pov. br. 7137).

issuing visas. At the same time, the embassy notified the Yugoslav MFA that a simplified procedure for allowing Yugoslav aircraft to overfly American occupation zones in Germany and Austria was now in force. Permits would now be issued by the embassy in Belgrade within 48 hours of receiving a request. However, Yugoslav Air Force Command and the MFA only authorized the flights until July 1st. No reason for such action was stated.³

A draft agreement on air transport between Yugoslavia and the United States was proposed in 1945. It had nine articles and an annex. The first part of the agreement affirmed the principle of reciprocity in opening and maintaining air services between the two countries, the introduction of reasonable and fair taxes and fees for the use of airports, fuel and lubricating oil, and a reduction or abolition of customs fees on spare parts and equipment on aircraft operating lines between the two countries. Aircrew licences and aircraft certificates of airworthiness would be mutually recognised. Aircraft of the contracting parties would have to observe the laws of the other party while on its territory or in its airspace. Both contracting parties retained the right to withdraw operating permits for air services if the other party's aircraft were not abiding their laws or if the air carrier operating the service was no longer in majority ownership of or under effective control by citizens of the other contracting party. The agreement was supposed to be registered with the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization and it could be cancelled with a notice period of one year. Both parties could ask for consultations related to changes of the annex. These would begin within sixty days after the request and would come into force after being confirmed by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

The annex stated that an air carrier designated by the US government would have the right of transit and non-commercial landing on Yugoslav soil, as well as the right to perform commercial flights on the route from New York via intermediate points in Europe to Belgrade and beyond in both directions. A Yugoslav carrier would have the right of transit, non-commercial and commercial landing in USA, with the exact route being determined later. It can be assumed that the draft originated as an American initiative, but the exact motivation and expectations remain unknown. In any case, it remained merely a draft.⁴

³ DA MSP, PA, 1946, MVS, f. 77, pov. br. 7570, nota Ambasade SAD u Beogradu MIP FNRJ, 25. 6. 1946. i odgovor MIP FNRJ, 27. 6. 1946.

⁴ AJ, 836, I-3-b/740, nacrt Ugovora o vazdušnom saobraćaju između SAD i Jugoslavije. The draft isn't dated, but the cover of the archival record contains the year 1945. The introductory part of the agreement refers to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), signed on December 7th, 1944, so it had to be prepared after that date. The mentioned note of the US embassy in Belgrade from June 4th, 1946 (see the previous footnote), states that certain suggestions related to civil aviation were made by the embassy to the Yugoslav MFA in April 1945. This means that the draft could have been submitted at that time. A representative of the Yugoslav London-based Government-in-exile was present at the conference, but didn't sign the convention, which was only ratified by the Yugoslav Government in 1954 (refer to: https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf, accessed on 21. 2. 2022. i *Godišnji bilten Uprave civilnog vazduhoplovstva*, god. 1, br. 1, (1955), 14).

Up to 1948, Yugoslav Airlines (JAT), the country's national flag carrier, only operated internal services and two international lines, to Prague and Warsaw. These were closed after 1948 and the worsening of relations between Yugoslavia and other socialist countries caused by the Resolution of the Informbureau. JAT opened its first line to Western Europe, namely Zurich, in 1949. Further expansion of JAT's network towards West Germany (Munich and Frankfurt) demanded an air transport agreement with the United States. After the Second World War Allied powers assumed jurisdiction over all affairs of the German state, including civil aviation, and both cities were in the American zone of occupation. The agreement was made on December 24th, 1949. According to it, the Yugoslav designated airline⁵ received the right of transit and to perform technical (non-commercial) landings on all airports in the American occupation zones of Germany and Austria, as well as the right to perform commercial landings on two airports in the same zone of Germany and one airport in Austria. The American designated airline was given the right of transit and technical landings in Yugoslavia, as well as commercial rights on the route from North America via the North Atlantic and Europe to Belgrade and vice-versa. Both contracting parties had the right not to use any intermediate points on the agreed routes. It was also agreed that services would commence after consultations of one party's designated carrier with the other party's authorities on how the agreed routes would be operated. All fees related to fuel, spare parts and use of airports were to be fair and reasonable. Aircraft of both parties would observe laws of the other while in its respective airspace. Both parties would recognise the others crew licences and certificates of airworthiness, and they pledged to work together on facilitating all procedures related to operating agreed services. If one party considered it necessary to amend parts of the agreement, it could demand consultations within thirty days after filing the request. It was especially noted that the Yugoslav Government would invoke this provision once it decides to introduce a Yugoslav air service to the United States. The agreement would remain in force until cancelation by one of the contracting parties or replacement by a "more general agreement".⁶

The 1949 air transport agreement enabled JAT to open the Belgrade – Zagreb – Munich – Frankfurt service in 1950. This was later extended to Paris and London. Pan American World Airways (Pan Am), the leading American international air carrier, started overflying Yugoslav territory on the Frankfurt – Istanbul leg of its around-the-world route. This shortened its length significantly, as it was previously operated via Italy, the Ionian Sea and Greece. However,

⁵ The term "designated airline" is used for an airline which, in accordance with an air transport agreement, has been designated by its government to operate air traffic between the signatory countries.

⁶ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1949, f. 98, pov. br. 422863, šifrovani telegram Ambasadu FNRJ u Vašingtonu MIP FNRJ, 24. 12. 1949; Ibid., SAD, 1955, f. 60, pov. br. 410498, dopis Pravnog saveta DSIP II odeljenju DSIP, 29. 7. 1955; „Решење о потврђивању Споразума о ваздушном саобраћају између Федеративне Народне Републике Југославије и Сједињених Америчких Држава“, *Службени лист ФНРЈ*, бр. 17, 8. 3. 1950, 397–398.

the US embassy in Belgrade had to request permissions for these overflights from the Yugoslav MFA and, later, the State Secretariate for Foreign Affairs (SSFA). The requests contained the flight schedule, points of entry into and exit from Yugoslav airspace, lists of aircraft with their registrations, possible crew members and radionavigation and communication devices onboard. SSFA would consult the Directorate of Civil Aviation (DCA) on the matter and would grant the permission, usually for a period of six months. The table below shows the significance of Yugoslav airspace to US air carriers.⁷

Year	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Number of overflights	431	483	592	694	797	727	781	784

Number of overflights of Yugoslav territory
performed by American passenger aircraft 1955-1962

Besides Pan Am, another American air carrier, Trans World Airlines (TWA), was interested in using Yugoslav airspace. In 1951, it asked for permission to extend its New York to Zurich route to Belgrade and Athens, as well as to open a new route from Rome to Belgrade. This request was rejected for several reasons. JAT would get serious competition on its route from Belgrade to Zurich, which it operated together with Swissair. TWA would also be the only airline flying from Belgrade to Rome and Athens. Finally, TWA wasn't designated to fly to Yugoslavia by the US Government.⁸

The 1949 air transport agreement lost part of its purpose in 1955. At that point, West Germany received jurisdiction over civil aviation matters, which meant that Yugoslavia had to sign a new air transport agreement with the West German government. Furthermore, the agreement became unfavourable for Yugoslavia as only American air carriers were given the right to fly between the US and Yugoslavia, although Pan Am still wasn't interested in operating such a service. For these reasons, the 1949 agreement was terminated in 1959. There were suggestions to conclude a new agreement in 1960, but the idea was dropped for two reasons. The first one was the fact that JAT didn't have the capacity to operate service to the US. The second reason was the fact that no Yugoslav airport could handle aircraft capable of flying across the Atlantic Ocean. In 1955, JAT contemplated the purchase of three or four Douglas DC-6B aircraft. They had four piston engines and could safely fly over the Atlantic Ocean. However, JAT only operated one from 1959 to 1963. This airplane had a normal passenger configuration and was meant to fly those accompanying President Josip Broz Tito, who would fly the executive version of the same type.

⁷ Examples of such requests can be found in: AJ, fond 620, Uprava civilnog vazduhoplovstva, f. 197; Grupa autora, *Priča o Jugoslovenskom aerotransportu* (Beograd: Jugoslovenski aerotransport 1987), 44, 47. Data on the number of overflights was taken from appropriate editions of the *Annual Bulletin of the Directorate of Civil Aviation (Godišnji bilten Uprave civilnog vazduhoplovstva)*.

⁸ AJ, 620-197, dopisi Ministarstva saobraćaja FNRJ MIP FNRJ od 17. i 27. 2. 1951.

Both aircraft wore civilian registrations (YU-AFA for the executive and YU-AFB for the passenger plane) and JAT markings. The passenger plane was only used on two routes within Europe and the Mediterranean, Belgrade – Zagreb – Munich – Paris and Belgrade – Athens – Cairo, to supplement other aircraft when it wasn't used by the state. In 1960, this plane was used to transport part of the Yugoslav delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, meaning that it couldn't be used by JAT at that time, but also signifying that, at least in theory, JAT could operate a route to the US. In 1963, the passenger DC-6B was given to the Yugoslav Air Force as JAT replaced it on the two mentioned routes by the French-made Sud Aviation Caravelle jets, designed specifically for short- and medium-range services.⁹

Things weren't any better when it came to Yugoslav civilian airports. In 1955, only Belgrade airport had a concrete runway, but it was only 1600 metres long. This limited the aircraft maximum take-off weight, which would then limit their fuel and passenger capacity. It also made use of jet aircraft on regular passenger services completely impossible. All other Yugoslav airports had grass runways not longer than 1200 metres, and airports along the Adriatic coast were only used during summer. Construction of the new Belgrade airport was supposed to be completed by 1958, but only started that year and was completed in 1962. Besides this, the already mentioned overflight permits were sufficient for the needs of Pan Am.¹⁰

JAT operated American aircraft from its very beginnings in 1947. At first, Douglas C-47 military transport aircraft were obtained via the UNRRA or from brokers in Western Europe. They were then converted into DC-3 passenger aircraft. The first true contact JAT made with American aircraft industry was in 1952, when three modern Convair CV-340 planes were ordered for international services. In 1954, JAT announced that it wouldn't be able to pay for the aircraft, leading US secretary of state John Foster Dulles to suggest giving a loan to Yugoslavia to pay for the aircraft. He reasoned that Convair had to remain competitive towards the British manufacturer Vickers, whose Viscount aircraft were taking over a share of the market. Yugoslavia managed to avoid this by spending funds from the Central Foreign Exchange Fund. The aircraft were in service in 1954, but two of them were lost in accidents within two years. JAT ordered two CV-440s (modernised 340s) as replacements. At this

⁹ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1955, f. 60, pov. br. 410498, dopis Pravnog saveta DSIP II odeljenja DSIP, 29. 7. 1955; Ibid., SAD, 1959, f. 114, pov. br. 47850, dopis UCV FNRJ Pravnom savetu DSIP FNRJ, 8. 1. 1959. i odgovor Pravnog saveta Upravi civilnog vazduhoplovstva, 20. 3. 1959; Ibid., SAD, 1960, f. 122, pov. br. 45231, dopis Službe za pravne poslove i međunarodne ugovore DSIP FNRJ Ambasadi FNRJ u Vašingtonu, 25. 2. 1960; Ibid., pov. br. 418101, telegram DSIP FNRJ Ambasadi FNRJ u Vašingtonu, 6. 7. 1960; AJ, fond 130, Savezno izvršno veće, 729-1185, Tehnička analiza kupovine aviona za potrebe preduzeća Jugoslovenski aerotransport, 8. 12. 1955; AJ, fond 599, Savezni sekretarijat za saobraćaj i veze, f. 195, Jugoslovenski aerotransport: izveštaj o radu 1960.

¹⁰ AJ, 620-197, Prijava za dobijanje odobrenja za obavljanje redovnog leta u vazдушnom prostoru FNRJ, 4. 12. 1959; *Uprava civilnog vazduhoplovstva: godišnji bilten*, god 1, br. 1, 21–22.

point, there were suggestions that the United States Air Force should give one aircraft from its order to JAT. This was deemed to be beneficial for US-Yugoslav relations in general, as well as a propaganda success, since it was expected that JAT would use the modern aircraft to open a route to Moscow. Eventually, JAT agreed to postpone the delivery until 1957, and it only opened the Moscow route in 1965 with Caravelles.¹¹

Besides the Convairs, JAT also operated the single DC-6B. At the time of its introduction, Pan Am and American diplomats were worried that JAT would use the plane on a route between Yugoslavia and the US, which Pan Am wasn't interested in. However, they were proven wrong by the fact that JAT only operated the plane in Europe. However, the Ljubljana-based charter operator Adria Airways bought four second-hand DC-6Bs from the Netherlands in 1961. These planes were used to bring tourists from Western Europe to Yugoslavia, and to connect Yugoslavia to Africa and the Middle East. That same year, JAT contemplated buying two Douglas DC-8 long-range jet aircraft but didn't go through with the purchase. It was probably realised that there wouldn't be enough passengers to operate services between Yugoslavia and the USA at a profit.¹²

Second phase: a new agreement and first true services between Yugoslavia and the United States (1963-1977)

The first air carrier to operate on routes between Yugoslavia and the United States was Pan Am. Thanks to the opening of a new airport near Belgrade, Pan Am started landing there on their around-the-world route in 1963. Since there was no air transport agreement between the two countries at the time, Yugoslav authorities granted Pan Am a temporary permission to operate the service. Pan Am was obliged to land at Belgrade, since Yugoslav authorities declared that one third of all foreign passenger aircraft overflying Yugoslavia must land at Belgrade, while granting commercial rights to their owners. In 1968, Pan Am abolished the around-the-world service and introduced a route between New York and Belgrade via London or Glasgow. From 1970, stops at Dusseldorf and Stuttgart were introduced and the route was extended to Bucharest next year. The oil crisis of 1973 forced Pan Am to abolish the route to Belgrade during 1974, with operations recommencing already in 1975.¹³

¹¹ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1955, f. 60, pov. br. 415493, telegram III odeljenja DSIP Ambasadi FNRJ u Vašingtonu, 3. 11. 1955; Phil Tiemeyer, "Launching a Nonaligned Airline: JAT Yugoslav Airways between East, West, and South, 1947-1962", *Diplomatic History*, vol. 41, no. 1, (januar 2017), 78-103, (pristupljeno 31. 1. 2022) <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhv061>, 16-19; Владимир Крстић, *Учеиће Јосипа Броза Тита на XV заседању Генералне скупштине УН (20. 9 – 4. 10. 1960)* (дипломски рад, Универзитет у Београду, Филозофски факултет, Одељење за историју, 2017), 22.

¹² AJ, fond 837, Kabinet Predsednika Republike, III-A-4-c, k. 52, Informacija o nabavci aviona, 24. 9. 1961; Ph. Tiemeyer, *op. cit.*, 19-25.

¹³ Refer to the *Annual Bulletin (Godišnji bilten)* of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation of Yugoslavia, 1963-1976.

Year	Airplanes arrived and departed	Passengers arrived	Passengers departed	Cargo arrived (in metric tons)	Cargo departed (in metric tons)
1963	135	1706	1458	45	11
1964	195	3091	3013	28	17
1965	195	3507	3420	38,1	28
1966	204	3796	3675	71	40
1967	185	4299	4354	60	39,25
1968	114	2820	3075	86,5	60,6
1969	107	2990	2820	84	133
1970	103	3133	3410	103,7	159,6
1971	171	4561	4236	115	98
1972	225	6623	5663	–	–
1973	224	5689	5045	–	–
1974	No Pan Am flights to Belgrade during the year				
1975	152	3422	3305	–	–
1976	264	5275	5395	–	–

Pan Am operations at Belgrade airport 1963-1976

Note: There is no information on cargo transport after 1971

A new agreement on air transport was now becoming necessary. Yugoslav air carriers began serving the US market. Adria Airways operated charter flights to the United States from 1964 to 1966 and JAT opened its office in New York in 1965. Pan Am also wanted to settle its operations in Yugoslavia in a more permanent manner. In 1968, the Yugoslav Government authorized the Directorate General of Civil Aviation to begin negotiations on the matter of an agreement on air transport. Even though most aspects of the agreement were agreed upon, there was no solution to the problem of Pan Am doing business in Yugoslavia. The Americans demanded the right to sell tickets freely and to open an office of their own in Yugoslavia, while Yugoslav regulations stated that foreign enterprises could only do business through a Yugoslav agent and that they couldn't exchange Yugoslav dinars for hard currency, in this case US dollars. Pan Am had to pay JAT 104,000\$ in 1971 alone for representation costs. The same amount of money could have been used to furnish an office in Belgrade.¹⁴

Yugoslav air carriers began appearing in earnest on the American market in 1969. JAT rented a single Convair Coronado four-engine jet and set up a charter department of its own, Air Yugoslavia. In 1970, American authorities granted JAT permission to operate twenty non-scheduled (charter) flights per year over the following three years. Each flight over this quota would be approved on an individual basis. In 1972, Inex-Adria also started flying to America. This led to a

¹⁴ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1968, f. 181, pov. br. 411909, dopis SUCVP III upravi DSIP SFRJ, 18. 3. 1968; Ibid., SAD, 1969, f. 164, pov. br. 411952, dopis SUCVP DSIP, 2. 4. 1969; Ibid., pov. br. 423897, dopis SUCVP DSIP, 2. 4. 1969; Ibid., SAD, 1972, f. 109, pov. br. 420399, dopis Uprave za Severnu i Južnu Ameriku DSIP SUCVP, 30. 5. 1972; Ibid., SAD, 1975, f. 138, pov. br. 432707, dopis JAT-a SSIP, 8. 7. 1975; *Direkcija za civilnu vazdušnu plovidbu: godišnji bilten*, god. 11, br. 11, (1965), 15; Ibid., god. 12, br. 12, (1966), 15; Ibid., 13, br. 13, (1967), 15.

confrontation between JAT and Inex-Adria on the American market which had to be resolved by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. The two companies agreed to work together on the American market. According to available data, JAT flew 1482 passengers between the two countries during 1970 using a single Boeing 707. In 1971, this number rose to 7958 passengers with three Boeings in use, and to 28150 passengers with four Boeings in use during 1972. That same year, Inex-Adria transported around 3800 passengers using a single leased Douglas DC-8. While each of them had the right to perform 20 charter flights in 1972, JAT performed around 100 and Inex-Adria more than 20. Their destinations in the US were New York, Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Los Angeles, connecting these cities with Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana and cities along the Yugoslav Adriatic coast. In 1973, JAT became the only Yugoslav air carrier flying to the US as Adria abandoned this market completely. These services were aimed at American tourists visiting Yugoslavia and at Americans of Yugoslav origin wanting to visit the "old country".¹⁵

Negotiations on the Non-scheduled Air Service Agreement were conducted twice during 1972. Besides the mentioned problems related to representation of American air carriers in Yugoslavia, another question that had to be resolved was "directional balance", i.e., the relation of the number of flights originating in the US compared to the number of flights originating in Yugoslavia. While the Yugoslav delegation demanded a 4:1 balance, the Americans were willing to allow a 4:3 balance, with Yugoslavia receiving more inbound flights in both cases. However, pressure to conclude the agreement also came from the American side, since the American travel agencies monitored the situation very carefully. If they judged that the negotiations were not going in the right direction, they were ready to cancel arrangements in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav diplomats estimated that there was significant room for Yugoslav air carriers to do business in America, but that the United States would insist on a directional balance due to its own negative tourism balance.¹⁶

The Non-scheduled Air Service Agreement was finally signed on September 27th, 1973. This meant that, at the time, there were no scheduled services between the two countries and that there were yearly limitations to the number

¹⁵ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1972, f. 109, pov. br. 45813, šifrovani telegram Generalnog konzulata SFRJ u Njujorku SSIP, 14. 2. 1972. i šifrovani telegram III uprave SSIP Gen. konzulatu SFRJ u Njujorku, 20. 3. 1972; Ibid., pov. br. 431795, kopija dopisa SUCVP Saveznom izvršnom veću, 29. 9. 1972; Ibid., SAD, 1973, f. 99, pov. br. 4980, šifrovani telegram Konzulata SFRJ u Njujorku, 8. 1. 1973; Чедомир Јанић и Јово Симишић, *Више од летења. Осам деценија Аеропута и ЈАТ-а*, (Београд: Јат Airways, 2007), 94–95. In 1969 Adria Airways was merged with the Belgrade-based foreign trade company Interexport and operated as Inex-Adria Airways until 1986.

¹⁶ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1972, f. 109, pov. br. 429231, Izveštaj sa pregovora za zaključenje sporazuma o charter saobraćaju između SFRJ i SAD, 28. 7. 1972; Ibid., pov. br. 437620, Izveštaj sa pregovora za zaključenje sporazuma o charter saobraćaju između SFRJ i SAD, 18. 10. 1972; Ibid., pov. br. 438562, šifrovani telegram Ambasade SFRJ u Vašingtonu, 30. 10. 1972; Ibid., pov. br. 444886, dopis Saveznog sekretarijata za saobraćaj i veze III upravi SSIP, 14. 12. 1972; Ibid., SAD, 1973, f. 99, pov. br. 4980, šifrovani telegram Konzulata SFRJ u Njujorku, 8. 1. 1973.

of flights that could be operated. The first part of the agreement defined the general rules, such as guaranteeing the same rights to air carriers of both contracting parties, the recognition of documents related to aircrews and aircraft, payments of taxes, tariffs and fees, the prohibition of disloyal competition. Annex A defined the rights of air carriers. They were allowed to perform charter air services (types of these services were defined in Annex B) between the United States and Yugoslavia without the right to land commercially on any intermediate points or points before or beyond the respective countries. Due to the limited ability of Yugoslav citizens to travel abroad, flights from Detroit were not counted in the directional balance of Yugoslav air carriers. Because of Yugoslav carriers' limited capacities compared to US carriers, the same went for flights from Los Angeles until the introduction of regular services. Separate proceedings on the new directional balance formula attached to the agreement allowed for 110 flights between Yugoslavia and the US to be operated by Yugoslav air carriers during 1973.¹⁷

This period saw an increase in cooperation between Yugoslav air carriers and American aviation industry. Around 1966, JAT and Inex-Adria were planning the purchase of new passenger jets for their routes in Europe and the Mediterranean. While JAT opted for the Boeing 737-200, and Inex-Adria went with the McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-32, both obtained the DC-9. The reason was that McDonnell-Douglas accepted payment through exports of Yugoslav goods to the United States and several sources state that the goods were in fact processed meat. Since passenger numbers grew beyond expectations, JAT also purchased the larger Boeing 727-200 aircraft for its European services. JAT was much more careful when choosing its first long-range jet, however. It was decided not to buy brand new aircraft immediately. Instead, second-hand aircraft of a reliable and proven type were to be used while the long-range routes developed, and to leave aircraft maintenance and personnel training to a larger company. Because of this JAT leased and then bought several Boeing 707 aircraft from several companies, while training and maintenance were performed in cooperation with Pan Am.¹⁸

Another type of cooperation between the United States and Yugoslavia in the field of air transport was sending Yugoslav airmen and experts of other profiles to training in the United States. In the first case, pilots were trained by aircraft manufacturers or American air carriers that used the same aircraft as

¹⁷ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1973, f. 98, pov. br. 446348, kopija Sporazuma o vanrednom vazdušnom saobraćaju između Vlade SFRJ i Vlade SAD, 27. 9. 1973.

¹⁸ AJ, 130-729-1185, Uz problematiku nabavke novih aviona, 18. 10. 1968; Ibid., pismo generalnog direktora JAT-a Vidomira Krunića Saveznom sekretarijatu za privredu, 6. 4. 1970; AJ, 837, I-2/50-1, Stenografske beleške sa zajedničke sednice Predsedništva SFRJ i Saveznog izvršnog veća, 19. 11. 1971; dokument Izbor novog tipa aviona za saobraćaj u evropsko-mediteranskoj oblasti (skraćeni investicioni elaborat), nedatiran, u vlasništvu autora ovog rada; Grupa autora, *Priča o jugoslovenskom aerotransportu*, 74-81, 85, 92, 97, 105-107; Ч. Јанић и Ј. Симишић, *Више од летења*, 92-93, 100-101, 108-109; Коста Бојовић, *Животни пут једног ваздухопловца: сећања на време људе и догађаје*, 2. издање (Београд: издање аутора, 2018), 176-177; Zlatko Kurjaković, *Pan Adria JPTT: hrvatski Ikar* (Zagreb: Biakova, 2020), 17.

JAT. For example, Boeing 707 crews were trained in 1970 and 1971 in two groups at the Pan Am Training Centres in Miami and Sacramento. In the second case, Yugoslav experts were studying at American civil aviation institutions and transferring their experiences to Yugoslavia. Here are two examples. During 1961, Georgije Ninčić, the head of the JAT's Training Department, visited several flying schools and institutions of the Civil Aviation Administration of the United States. His conclusion was that JAT must establish its own flight school in which pilots would be trained according to proper standards. This would break the personnel dependence of JAT on the Aeronautical Union of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Air Force, while raising the quality of flight personnel and transport safety in general. Based on this, JAT took over the Aeronautical Union's Federal Aviation Centre in Vršac in 1972 and in 1973 established the Pilot School within its Training Centre. In the second case, the director of the Directorate of Civil Aviation, Batrić Jovanović, spent the end of 1964 training in the USA, where he visited several airports and civil aviation institutions to get acquainted with their work and organization.¹⁹

Third phase: the peak and the collapse (1977-1992)

Although the 1973 Non-scheduled Air Service Agreement partly regulated air transport between Yugoslavia and the US, there was growing interest to introduce scheduled services, especially on the Yugoslav side. These were much more attractive to passengers than charters, which are usually booked by a travel agency. Additionally, permits were still needed for the flights, and these could, in theory, be denied, meaning that services were at times uncertain. In May 1976, an interim agreement on regular air traffic was concluded by exchange of notes, valid until March 31, 1978. JAT thus received the right to operate the Belgrade – Zagreb – New York service twice a week with B-707s. Additional flights had to be requested 45 days in advance, and additional lines 30 days in advance through diplomatic correspondence. Pan Am was granted an extension of the license for regular traffic with three weekly return flights using B-707 aircraft or equivalent capacities (one aircraft with less than 200 seats instead of one B-707, 201-300 seats instead of 1.5 B-707, 301-400 seats instead of 2 B-707 and 400 or more seats instead of 2.5 B-707). As Yugoslav regulations still did not allow Pan Am to operate independently in Yugoslavia, it was agreed that Pan Am and JAT would represent each other in their respective countries. Based on the interim agreement, on June 10, 1976, JAT received a permit from the American authorities to maintain regular traffic between Yugoslavia and the US until March 31, 1977. JAT was granted the right to fly two weekly services in accordance with the interim agreement, as well as the right to

¹⁹ AJ, 599-169, dopis Uprave za tehničku pomoć Sekretarijatu SIV-a za saobraćaj i veze, 19. 10. 1961; DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1965, f. 153, pov. br. 43091, izveštaj B. Jovanovića o boravku u SAD, 18. 1. 1965; K. Bojović, *n. d.*, 132-137; Георгије Нинчић, *Мoj живот* (Београд: издање аутора, 2011), 178-180.

perform a maximum of 80 charter flights per year. JAT's first regular line to the United States, marked JU500, was inaugurated on June 15, 1976. The interim agreement was later extended until March 31, 1978.²⁰

The Air Transport Agreement was finally signed on December 15th, 1977. It regulated all basic matters relating to regular air services between Yugoslavia and the US just like the 1973 Non-scheduled Air Service Agreement. Annex A of the 1977 Agreement specified the routes to be operated by designated carriers of both contracting parties. JAT was allowed to fly the route from Yugoslavia via Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and Montreal to New York. Pan Am was given the right to fly from the United States via intermediary points to Zagreb and Belgrade and beyond. Landing at Zagreb was only allowed from April 1st, 1979. Both carriers had the right not to land at some or any intermediate points on some or all their flights.²¹

In addition to the Agreement, a special Memorandum of Understanding was concluded, also relating to Non-scheduled Air Service Agreement. This Memorandum was concluded to ensure equal opportunities for designated carriers from both countries. Section A regulated the rights of airlines. Point 1 determined the representatives of the carriers in the territory of each of the contracting countries. Point 2 gave Pan Am the right to sell tickets in Yugoslavia under several conditions. First, tickets could be sold for convertible currency using Pan Am's own transport documents for all their services. Second, Pan Am could sell ticket on its own or through agents for Yugoslav currency to Yugoslav citizens using JAT traffic documents on its direct line between Yugoslavia and the US, on its routes between Europe and the US, between Yugoslavia and anywhere in Europe, between Yugoslavia and the countries bordering it and Turkey, as well as on the routes of other American carriers within the United States when connected with Pan Am's services to Yugoslavia and landing points in Europe. Third, Pan Am could sell all other tickets for regular flights through Yugoslav agents using their transport documents. Pan Am also had the right to convert the proceeds in dinars into a freely convertible currency and transfer them through the Accounting Bank of the International Air Transport Association or to their own account with any Yugoslav bank. Commercial conditions granted to Pan Am were to be equal to those provided to any other foreign air carrier in Yugoslavia. In Section 3, the US Government authorized JAT to sell tickets on its territory directly or through agents.²²

²⁰ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1976, f. 133, pov. br. 429129, kopija note Stejt departmenta Ambasadi SFRJ u Vašingtonu i odgovora Ambasade SFRJ, 14. 5. 1976; Ibid., pov. br. 442007, kopija naredbe o izdavanju dozvole JAT-u za obavljanje redovnog vazdušnog saobraćaja u SAD, 21. 6. 1976; Ibid., SAD, 1977, f. 129, pov. br. 437450, kopije nota Stejt departmenta, 17. 5. 1977. i Ambasade SFRJ u Vašingtonu, 30. 6. 1977.

²¹ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1978, f. 130, pov. br. 42425, kopija Sporazuma o vazdušnom saobraćaju između SFRJ i SAD, 15. 12. 1977. sa priložima; Ibid., dopis SSIP-a Saveznom izvršnom veću, 13. 2. 1979.

²² Ibid., Memorandum o saglasnosti u vezi sa Sporazumom o vazdušnom saobraćaju i Sporazumom o vanrednom vazdušnom saobraćaju.

Point 4 regulated the amount of return flights JAT could operate with narrow-body aircraft, as shown in the table below.

Period	Number of flights
Summer 1978.	135
Winter 1978/1979.	99
Summer 1979.	180
Winter 1979/1980.	132
Summer 1980.	180
Winter 1980/1981.	132
Summer – from April 1 st to October 31 st	
Winter – from November 1 st to March 31 st	

Number of return flights to be operated by JAT according to the Memorandum of understanding related to the 1977 Agreement on regular air services

Narrow-body aircraft could be replaced by wide-body ones, so that one wide-body aircraft with a capacity of 201-300 seats replaced one and a half narrow-body aircraft, and one wide-body aircraft with a capacity of 301 and more seats replaced two narrow-body aircraft. Additional frequencies and lines could be operated only with permission from American authorities. The request had to be submitted through diplomatic correspondence between 120 and 180 days before the start of services, and American authorities had to respond within 60 days after receiving the request. In addition, a possibility was left to submit the request for special services on additional lines through diplomatic channels 15 days before the start of operations. Point 5 stipulated that “prior consents and any other necessary issues” must be considered in consultations before March 31, 1981, otherwise the line plan and prior consents will expire on that day. Section B stipulated that the extension of JAT’s regular New York line to Chicago and/or Los Angeles will be considered during the negotiations. In Section C, both parties agreed that the Agreement and the amendments set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall provisionally enter into force on the date of signature.²³

In accordance with this agreement, JAT initially operated regular traffic between Belgrade, Zagreb, and New York with B-707 aircraft. From December 15, 1978, as allowed by American authorities, it introduced the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 wide-body aircraft on three weekly services. This number was increased to four in 1979 and five in 1980. Flights to Cleveland, Detroit and Los Angeles were still non-scheduled, while one regular weekly flight to New York was extended to Chicago. In 1980, Pan Am suspended several services due to financial problems, including the one to Belgrade. At the end of 1980, negotiations began on amendments to the Memorandum of Understanding. A new Memorandum was concluded in Belgrade during negotiations between April 8 and 15, 1981. The designated American carrier, in addition to previous rights,

²³ Ibid.

was given the right to sell its own transport documents to Yugoslav citizens for dinars through agents, while the Yugoslav carrier was given the right to operate four regular weekly frequencies by wide-body planes between Belgrade and New York, two weekly frequencies to Chicago (with or without landing in New York) and could seek additional frequencies and sectors under earlier conditions. Regarding charter flights, carriers of both sides have been granted the right to such flights, as well as the right to combine charter flights within the territory of the other Contracting Party. This meant that, for example, JAT had the right to board a part of passengers in Chicago, and a part in Cleveland, all on the same flight. The Memorandum was valid until March 31, 1982, with the possibility of extension for one year by exchanging confirmatory notes if there was no need to amend it. The validity of this document was indeed extended in this way. It was not until 1985 that the memorandum was amended to give Pan Am landing rights in Dubrovnik and JAT the right to fly to Cleveland via Chicago. The following year, in accordance with the decisions of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the memorandum also included provisions concerning mutual guarantees on issues of protection against hijacking and other violations of air safety.²⁴

Yugoslav air carriers continued relying on American aircraft during this time. JAT purchased the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-30 as its new long-range jet in 1977, although it first decided to obtain the Boeing 747SP. In the 1980's it decided to gradually replace the DC-9 and B-727 with the B-737-300, becoming the first European operator of the version. On the other hand, Inex-Adria continued using McDonnell-Douglas aircraft, obtaining the MD-81 and MD-82, more modern and larger versions of the DC-9. Finally, at the end of the decade, JAT picked the McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 as the replacement for the DC-10 and was even supposed to become the first operator of the type in the world.²⁵

The collapse of Yugoslavia influenced air transport as well. In 1990, the number of weekly flights operated by JAT between the two countries was at first reduced from fourteen to twelve. By the end of the year, JAT no longer flew from Zagreb to the US and was no longer flying to Detroit, Cleveland, and Los Angeles. The number of weekly services to New York and Chicago was reduced from seven to four, and from four to two respectively. Despite this, JAT

²⁴ DA MSP, PA, SAD, 1980, f. 114, pov. br. 417575, zabeleška o razgovoru B. Radivojevića, samostalnog savetnika i W. Whitmana, ekonomskog savetnika Ambasade SAD, 26. 3. 1980; Ibid., pov. br. 432321, šifrovani telegram Ambasade SFRJ u Vašingtonu SSIP, 25. 9. 1980; Ibid., pov. br. 427715, izveštaj sa pregovora o izmenama i dopunama sporazuma o vazdušnom saobraćaju između SFRJ i SAD, 6. 5. 1980; Ibid., SAD, 1981, f. 100, pov. br. 420716, dopis Saveznog komiteta za saobraćaj i veze Službi za međunarodno-pravne poslove SSIP, 17. 4. 1981; Ibid., SAD, 1986, f. 81, pov. br. 454646, Predlog osnova za dopunu i produženje Memoranduma o saglasnosti [...], april 1986.

²⁵ „Boeing 747-SP u floti JAT“, *Jugoslovenski aerotransport*, 7. april 1977, 5; „DC-10 u floti JAT“, *Jugoslovenski aerotransport*, 2. jun 1977, 1, 3; Grupa autora, *Priča o Jugoslovenskom aerotransportu*, 110–113, 126–135; Ч. Јанић, Ј. Симишић, *Више од летења*, 72, 116–117, 122–123, 126.

still managed to transport 103,532 passengers and 4156 tons of cargo between Yugoslavia and the US during 1990, the last year of normal operations, making a profit of 65.5 million \$. Besides the reduction in traffic volume, JAT was forced to abandon the purchase of MD-11s and additional B-737-300s. Unrelated to this, Pan Am ended services to Yugoslavia after going bankrupt in December 1991, leaving JAT as the only air carrier operating services between Yugoslavia and the US for several months. Even before the UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came into force in 1992, the United States prohibited air transport between the two countries. JAT performed its last flight to Chicago on May 17th, and to New York on May 19th. The US prohibition and UN sanctions came into force on May 21st and May 30th, respectively, and US authorities closed JAT's office in New York on June 3rd, 1992. This put an end to air transport between Yugoslavia and the United States of America.²⁶

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²⁶ Ч. Јанић, Ј. Симишић, *Више од летења*, 95, 137–138; R. G. Grant, *Flight: The Complete History of Aviation* (London: Dorling Kindersley 2017), 397.

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DEVELOPMENT OF AIR TRANSPORT BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1945-1992

Summary

Air transport between Yugoslavia and the United States was one of the defining aspects of Yugoslav civil aviation after the Second World War. Cooperation between the two countries developed in several fields. Early attempts to regulate civil air transport by the means of a bilateral agreement were made as early as 1945, but without success. Three agreements on air transport were eventually signed in 1949, 1973 and 1977. Pan American World Airways started overflying Yugoslav territory in 1950 on its international routes between North America and the Middle East and started landing at Belgrade in 1963, thus providing a true connection between the two countries. From 1970, Yugoslav Airlines operated charter flights between Yugoslavia and USA, followed by the introduction of a regular service between Belgrade, Zagreb, and New York in 1976. From 1964 to 1966 and during 1972, another Yugoslav air operator, (Inex) Adria Airways also flew charter flights between Yugoslavia and the United States. Apart from this, most passenger airplanes used in Yugoslavia were made in the United States, while some Yugoslav factories manufactured components for American aircraft producers. Yugoslav airmen and other aviation experts undertook training in America, greatly improving the functioning and safety of Yugoslav civil aviation in general. The disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia and international sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 also led to a ban on air traffic between Yugoslavia and the rest of the world. The United States introduced this ban several days before the sanctions came into force, ending all air transport services between the two countries.

KEYWORDS: Yugoslavia, USA, Aviation, Air Transport, Yugoslav Airlines (JAT), Inex-Adria Airways (IAA), Pan American World Airways (Pan Am)