

## POLEMIKE / DEBATES

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### WHAT TYPOLOGICAL APPELLATION IS SUITABLE FOR TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA: RESPONSE TO MIHALJEVIĆ AND MILJAN

**ABSTRACT:** *The main aim of the paper is to expose the counterfactual, scientifically unfounded and unscholarly statements by Mihaljević and Miljan in the paper "Was Tito's Yugoslavia not Totalitarian?" We needed to treat the issues of (1) totalitarianism as a scholarly concept and a social construct, (2) the typological characterization of Tito's Yugoslavia, where there is substantial agreement among scholars that consociation fits it; (3) the organization of security services in Yugoslavia of the period, (4) the role of the republics in conducting foreign policy, which increased steadily; (5) monetary policy and seigniorage which came about, of which our critics were completely unaware, (6) the issue of the political system's dynamics (there were very substantial changes in the period 1945-1991) and (7) the issue of the political system's legitimacy. We also noted a number of minor mistakes, errors, and omissions by the authors at issue. A general failure by the authors to achieve scientific objectivity and to master the notions necessary for analysis is found.*

**KEYWORDS:** Authoritarianism, Josip Broz Tito, Communism, Consociation, Federation, Political System, Totalitarianism, Unitarianism, Yugoslavia

#### Introduction

Mihaljević and Miljan<sup>1</sup> devoted a rather long paper to polemicizing with our paper titled *Was Tito's Yugoslavia Totalitarian?*<sup>2</sup> They noted that they had

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<sup>1</sup> Josip Mihaljević and Goran Miljan, "Was Tito's Yugoslavia Not Totalitarian?", *Istorija 20. veka*, 38, br. 1, (2020), 223–238.

<sup>2</sup> Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek, "Was Tito's Yugoslavia Totalitarian?", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 47, (2014), 237–245.

received no response from the journal where the original paper was published (Communist and Post-Communist Studies). In this paper, we argue that this “silence” from the mentioned journal was largely warranted although we will not try to deny everything they hold and write. We will mainly focus on those points that indicate the futility and scientifically dubious nature of their undertaking while expanding on some of our original positions.

### The Issue of Totalitarianism

After reading the authors’ response we got the impression that the authors understood neither the research design nor the aim of our work. How could they otherwise miss the fact that we used totalitarianism as a methodological tool that enabled us to analyze the Yugoslav political system, that we did not adhere exclusively to the definition of Friedrich and Brzezinski, and that the aim of our study was not to consider how theoretically relevant the concept of totalitarianism was? In addition, it seems that they completely missed the fact that we were not to out prove whether the Yugoslav system was or was never totalitarian. We clearly wrote that we allowed it to be totalitarian until the mid-1960s. In this sense, their lengthy discussion, a large part of which represents a “plea” for a different, more “complex” (i.e., vague, see below) definition of totalitarianism, goes far beyond the aim of our study.

Still, some explanations regarding the concept of totalitarianism (and its use) are in order. As Woodward<sup>3</sup> notes, the concept of a “Cold War child,” used to flagellate communism, not only politically, but even ethically, cognitively, and aesthetically, went into disregard in political science back as early as in the 1970s. Still, as argued in our original paper, the term is used a lot. One of the more popular uses proposes joining fascism and communism into a single phenomenon, which in our opinion is problematic, as such endeavors completely disregard the humanist origins of Marxism. However, this is not the main problem of how totalitarianism as a concept has been (mis)used. The main problem is related to the fact that it is often not clear what is meant by totalitarianism, i.e., what the concept includes and what it does not. We would argue that the effort of Mihaljević and Miljan falls into this “trap” and as such cannot be seen as a viable critique of our work. Namely, our work tried to avoid these problems by being analytically and conceptually precise, i.e. not getting lost in vague definitions such as those offered by the authors, who, while evoking the omnipresent idea of complexity, try to convince us that it would be somehow better if we would conceptualize totalitarianism as something that is “neither static nor defined”.<sup>4</sup>

That said, one cannot deny scholars the right to offer their terms and arbitrarily define their contents in regard to certain concepts. One can also not deny that expanding concepts emerge (this is rather common in social sciences) or that such expansions are always without merit. But as said before – such undertakings

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<sup>3</sup> Joan Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 11.

<sup>4</sup> M. Mihaljević and M. Miljan, *op. cit.*, 226.

often lead to fluid, untestable, and scientifically vague outcomes that are then hard to communicate scientifically and as such offer little more than subjective impressions of the specific authors. To defend such efforts by stating that everything is very “complex” and “nothing is static” is, to put it mildly, quite awkward (more on this later on).

Next, it is worthwhile noting that since publishing our paper in 2004, we have dealt extensively with the elusive nature of the political system of Yugoslavia in the period 1966-1991.<sup>5</sup> So have other political scientists (that got completely overlooked by Mihaljević and Miljan), who largely agree that the Yugoslav political system was an authoritarian consociation. It is thus fruitful for the understanding of the Yugoslav political system to assess its nature along the axis: adjustment – integration, i.e. along the lines of consociation vs. the Westminster democracy.<sup>6</sup> Using this approach, it becomes clear that the SFRY expressed all of the features of an adjustment consociation:

(1) A “grand coalition” was formed, all relevant segments of society necessarily taking part (all republics took part in the federal government and in the LCY, this feature being ever more guaranteed);

(2) Consent by the relevant groups at decision-taking was needed (firstly informally, later the institutional veto power by the republics and the provinces was present) (considered essential by McCrudden and O’Leary<sup>7</sup>, 2013, 480);

(3) In the federal government not only proportional representation was present, but even the equality of members (after 1971);

(4) Autonomy in the organization of cultural life of constituent republics was always present (from 1974 also formally);

(5) There was – as to contending factions – a “neutral head of state”,<sup>8</sup> both in the case of Tito and the collective presidency after him, where it is possible to argue that this “neutrality” came at the expense of efficacy.<sup>9</sup> Horowitz (2000) believes elite(s) tend to abuse the consociation system for their own interests/objectives. He thus contends that consociations contribute to disassocia-

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<sup>5</sup> Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek, *Analiza razpada Jugoslavije v luči nacionalizma: kako sta kontinuiteta nacionalističnih prerekanj etničnih političnih elit in etnično podjetništvo uničila večinacionalno Jugoslavijo* (Maribor: Univerzitetna založba univerze, 2019a); Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek, *The Rise and Fall of Socialist Yugoslavia: Elite Nationalism and the Collapse of a Federation* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019b).

<sup>6</sup> Arent Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, *World Politics*, (21), 1969, 217–225; Arent Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New York, NY: Yale University Press, 1977).

<sup>7</sup> Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, *Courts and consociations: human rights versus power-sharing*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 11.

<sup>8</sup> Arent Lijphart and Marcus Crepaz, “Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages”, *British Journal of Political Science*, 21, (1991), 235–246.

<sup>9</sup> Consociation is so articulately present in the organization of the Yugoslav state, that one wonders whether Kardelj and the other “architects” were knowledgeable of the concept around 1970. Namely, Yugoslav leaders were open to external influences and were known to have looked at the then European Economic Community for inspiration as to decision making arrangement at that time (as recollected by first author).

tion, which is what happened in the Yugoslav case: the arrangement firstly brought about an institutional blockade and then finally the dissolution. Horowitz hence recommends “integrationism,” which in Yugoslav parlance would add up to centralism and Unitarianism (instead of consociation).

In sum, all of the conditions had been met, the only stumbling block being that the election was not liberal (such an election would have destroyed the consociation). As such the Yugoslav political system can be nominated as an *authoritarian consociation* from the mid-1960s on. This is also the common foothold of practically all the political scientists dealing with the issue: Goldman,<sup>10</sup> Bieber,<sup>11</sup> Shoup,<sup>12</sup> (1992) and Bogaards,<sup>13</sup> who conducted numerous comparative analyses of consociations. In his 2002 paper, he considers the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as a “consociational party”, as it was also a community of republic and provincial organizations and the decision making since the 1960s.<sup>14</sup>

Further, some authors distinguish predetermined and liberal consociations. In the former, the power share of (national) groups and their parties is determined by law, whereas in the latter it depends on electoral results. They opine that the latter one leads to stability, whereas the former one may be more centripetal (Choudhury<sup>15</sup>). Yugoslavia certainly fitted into the former. It also demonstrated the drawback noted.

As to the consociation, it became official with the 1971 constitutional amendments. However, as indicated, it could be observed on a less formal basis even earlier (e.g., decision making at the federal level was difficult well before 1971). In 1962, an extended LCY Politburo session was held, which is telling by itself. Whereas Tito expressed his concern on whether there was a future for a united Yugoslavia<sup>16</sup> (Ivan Gošnjak, minister of defense and Svetislav Stefanović, minister of the interior, Mijalko Todorović, federal vice-prime-minister, complained that the federal government was no longer a united body, having evolved into an arena for the promotion of republic interests solely.<sup>17</sup> Stefanović also stated that persons he knew from the interwar period “have changed beyond recognition. Some devil has got his grip upon us”,<sup>18</sup> In political science speech, they spoke of a malfunctioning consociation.

<sup>10</sup> Joseph Richard Goldman, “Consociational authoritarian politics and the Yugoslav 1974 Constitution: A preliminary note”, *East European Quarterly*, 19, (1985), 241–249.

<sup>11</sup> Florian Bieber, “Power Sharing and Democracy in Southeast Europe”, *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Special Issue, (2013), 130.

<sup>12</sup> Paul Shoup, “Titoism and nationality”, in: *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. European Studies*, Eds.: Martin Van den Heudel and Jan G. Siccama (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1992), 47–67.

<sup>13</sup> Matthijs Bogaards, “Consociational parties and political accommodation in ethno-plural societies”, (ECPR Joint Sessions. Turin, 1992); Matthijs Bogaards, *Democracy and Social Peace in Divided Societies: Exploring Consociational Parties* (London: Palgrave, 2014).

<sup>14</sup> M. Bogaards, “Consociational parties”, 2002; M. Bogaards, *Democracy and Social Peace*, 73–80.

<sup>15</sup> Sujit Choudhury, *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>16</sup> Miodrag Zečević (priv.), *Početak kraja SFRJ: stenogram i drugi prateći dokumenti proširene sednice Izvršnog komiteta CK SKJ održane 14–16. marta 1962* (Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1998), 31.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 181, 221.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

There is no doubt that consociational decision making, which is going to be expanded later in the hope of finding a balance, worked centrifugally toward an ever greater awareness of republic interests, objective or not, where the commonalities slowly faded from their vista. In 1969 and 1971 Tito repeatedly said he knew (and confided to others) that Yugoslavia would end up in disaster,<sup>19</sup> although he dealt with it in the only manner he knew: by excluding those who were too loud in promoting republic interests and openly invoking nationalism. Still, not only did Yugoslavia move from a *de facto* to a *de jure* consociation, Yugoslavia clearly demonstrated difficulties in reaching decisions. This is typical of divided societies, in which solutions are sought in consociationalism or, in Lijphart's terms, in "accommodation" to different "political cultures."<sup>20</sup> The blockage of the Federal Parliament by the Slovene representatives in late 1961, the difficulties in the adoption of mid-term economic plans, and problems concerning the adoption of the annual federal budgets throughout the 1980s are all indicative of consociation.

Yugoslav mid-term (usually 5-year) plans were never plans in the Soviet meaning, where the entire economic life was defined in kind.<sup>21</sup> As of the 1960s, the plans aimed to achieve certain development targets, which they mostly failed to do. However, republic communist leaders considered them important as they were related to certain measures in the economic system (taxation, subsidies, and particularly access to foreign financial assistance). Thus, even though these plans were usually not achieved,<sup>22</sup> the political elites had the economic policy instruments in mind and they also failed to recognize their unsuccessfulness.

One last point by way of illustration on how the consociation operated: whereas during the 1980s there were 4.000 political prisoners according to Meier, which may be inflated, in Slovenia there were no political prisoners by the end of the

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<sup>19</sup> S. Flere and R. Klanjšek, *Analiza razpada*, 147–148.

<sup>20</sup> In his seminal work, Lijphart uses the term "political cultures", for denoting different nationalities, linguistic, religious and other cultural groups (A. Lijphart, *Consociational Democracy*). The study was carried out a few years earlier, but American scholars Bertsch and Zaninovich found: "To summarize, those holding membership in the League of Communists -irrespective of nationality - tend to be less traditional and more modernizing in their perspectives and values than nonmembers. In addition, individuals belonging to the three more northerly nationality groups (i.e., Slovenes, Croats, Serbs) are inclined to be less parochial-traditional than Macedonians" (Gary Bertsch and George Zaninovich, "A Factor-Analytic Method of Identifying Different Political Cultures: The Multinational Yugoslav Case", *Comparative Politics*, 6, (1974), 228). They also found a "heartland political culture" "characterized by relative similarity of Serb-Croat (and party members) expression on all three factors analyzed" (240). They did not study national identity and feelings, nor ethnic distance, which will be exacerbated in the 1980s by ethnic entrepreneurship (S. Flere and R. Klanjšek, *The Rise and fall*; Duško Sekulić, Gerth Massey and Randy Hodson, "Ethnic Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of War in Croatia", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, (2006) 29, 118–142). No doubt the American scholars presented indirect opinions on these issues by analyzing the differences noted, so that in 1977 Brzezinski would be able to speak on the issue of political culture and the future of Yugoslavia in different terms (S. Flere and R. Klanjšek, *The Rise and fall*, 216).

<sup>21</sup> Neven Borak, *Ekonomski vidiki delovanja in razpada Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 2002), 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

1970s. This, of course, is not about federal decision making, but about the autonomy of the entities, this time not cultural in nature, which is particularly underscored by Lijphart, but even involving the politically sensitive issue of political prisoners.

### **The Issue of the Security Services**

Mihaljević and Miljan hold that security services in Yugoslavia were faultlessly integrated until the very end,<sup>23</sup> hence that a single UDBA existed, which would, by implication, further allow for its unbridled actions. However, we have found knowledge of a general nature to the contrary (as elaborated in our 2014 article), but also of specific instances. For example, in the 1980s, the Croat Republic Security Service planted an informer with the code name “Jeremija” inside the very episcopate of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Not only did they do so, but they also denied the federal security service the knowledge of his identity.<sup>24</sup> There were other instances of such struggles, for example between the security services of Bosnian-Herzegovina and Serbia. All this indicates that these services did not act within a perfect hierarchical, smoothly functioning system.

### **The Issue of Economic/Monetary System**

Another point where Mihaljević and Miljan seem to be on firm grounds is the monetary system of Yugoslavia, which they hail as a “unitaristic<sup>25</sup> monetary system” (220). They offer no economic analysis for this bold contention. For example, they offer no explanation for the stubborn inflation in Yugoslavia in the period 1979-1990, or earlier, which would need to be closely related to the nature of the system or its failure to be implemented, as monetary systems by definition have the task of providing monetary stability.

This issue was studied by Palaret and further elaborated by ourselves while conducting further research into the topic of socialist Yugoslavia. Namely, a double-digit inflation was persistent in the period commencing before 1979. The mechanism of creating inflation as of the 1970s experienced a strange twist, according to Palaret. It was not about the usual approving of governmental or para-governmental printing of cash: in its endeavor to ensure that the republics “settled accounts” with each other, the federal government remained almost without any economic instruments. The mechanism of “base money” creation was in the “system” of national banks. Along with the National Bank of Yugoslavia,<sup>26</sup> there were eight national banks of the republics and provinces (as well as the “military banking service”). There, the republics and provinces them-

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.

<sup>24</sup> S. Flere and R. Klanjšek, *The Rise and fall*, 202–203.

<sup>25</sup> “Unitarian” is the proper English word, “unitarist” is not recognized as a term.

<sup>26</sup> The issue of denominating national banks as “people’s banks” (p. 229) moved by Mihaljević and Miljan does not merit consideration. The term national bank is absolutely accepted in every use of the term.

selves, as well as economic enterprises, could borrow “practically without limit.” The negative balance of the republic with “its” national bank would later be entered into the off-budget imbalance of the federal national bank. This was a new “window” for drawing funds, in fact for producing inflation, invisible to the control of the executive or any branch of government or the public.

Palairret, studying the details of the issue, concluded that by this “system” one republic withdrew the most.<sup>27</sup> This resulted in high rates of inflation – when the federal government endeavored to suppress inflation, the republics continued with their endeavors to create “self-sufficient” economies. In a detailed financial analysis, Laihiri finds a peculiar form of seigniorage was at issue.<sup>28</sup> Seigniorage refers to state (“sovereign”) borrowing funds usually from the central bank, without the need to return it. In our case, there had been the dissemination of entities able to borrow without returning the debt. It remained forever in the books of the republic and federal national banks. The balancing of goods and services with money came to be by way of inflation and foreign debt. When Jeffery Sachs analyzed it in 1990, he was “surprised” to find this untypical situation (Palairret, 234), of “off-budget” nature.

Therefore, the republics and provinces continued with the policy of building “self-sufficient” economies, with the construction of manufacturing giants that would become catastrophic failures. Manufacturing plants were primarily at issue. Palairret refers to, for example, FENI and Feronikl in Macedonia, MKS steelworks in Smederevo, attempts to produce Zastava cars for the US market in Kragujevac, petro-chemical works DINA in Croatia.<sup>29</sup> In Slovenia probably the petroleum processing plant in Lendava could be added, in Vojvodina six sugar processing plants. In all instances, mechanical equipment was bought worth hundreds of millions of US dollars each, which would either not made operational at all, or not used to the intent. This was compensated “financially”, by way of republic national banks and finally the “system of the National Bank of Yugoslavia”.

Andrej Marinc, member of the LCY CC Presidency, 1979-1983 (in an interview with the first author, 18 June 1918), confirmed this leakage of funds. However, he considered that the National Bank of Yugoslavia could have prevented or at least halted it. In his experience, there was an attempt by the LCY CC Presidency to force the federal national bank to do so in 1981-2, but it failed. According to Marinc, the then governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, Radovan Makić, from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the then federal prime minister, Milka Planinc (who was officially conducting an austerity program), from Croatia, did not extend support for the necessary enforcement, certainly due to their own “republic concerns”.

Planinc and Makić had “pet projects” at home, although they were not “popular” politicians, not those inciting national feelings. A conclusion of rele-

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<sup>27</sup> Michael Palairret, “The inter-regional struggle for resources and the fall of Yugoslavia”, in: *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe. New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration*, eds.: Lenard Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007), 228–232.

<sup>28</sup> Ashok Laihiri, “Yugoslav inflation and money”, *IMF Working Paper*, 91/50, (1991), 1–46.

<sup>29</sup> M. Palairret, *op. cit.*, 224–225.

vance for Mihaljević and Miljan would be that not only those politicians who made public use of nationalism catered to their respective republics, but that this was the general practice as early as 1970, as testified by Tepavac to Tito (September 18, 1970: “I must say that every loyalty to federal bodies has been extinguished. It has been replaced by loyalty to republic centers, often bringing about incompetence to the detriment of Yugoslavia ...”).<sup>30</sup> As often, the public appearance may prove deceptive. Particularly Planinc was a known public figure: she achieved leadership posts under the banner of fighting Croat nationalism, but she nevertheless catered to republic interests.

Hence, the Yugoslav system did not produce monetary stability, but that was not because it was a “unitaristic monetary system,” or because there was a “unitaristic monetary policy,” even less so a “unitaristic monetary reality.” Possibly they were anything but “unitaristic monetary” in nature. Certainly, this is an area where holding to constitutional provisions is of little help, in contrast to other areas. An in-depth analysis is needed, where one would need to study the parallel “foreign currency system” (which is beyond the scope of this paper).

Mihaljević and Miljan also claim workers’ power within self-management was poor and that there was political interference in the economy. We did not analyze the first issue as it lacks relevance for our argument (and for the argument of Mihaljević and Miljan), but we did acknowledge it. The second argument is also true. There was political interference in economic life, many a time detrimental for economic processes, but not always. The Yugoslav economy grew well until 1979 (later also, but weakly), its investments were efficient, after 1979 they flopped, in the very complex arrangement of associated labor and particularly in the financial sphere, which was relegated to a subjugated position. (We dealt with this above).

### The Issue of Legitimacy

Mihaljević and Miljan deny that the Yugoslav communist state enjoyed legitimacy, with no qualifications as to time and space (p. 237). They refer only to the work of one Sabrina Ramet, who truly shares their opinion. However, they bypass abundant literature and many social facts that would not support such a contention. For example, Županov who maintained that egalitarianism was at the core of the Yugoslav system.<sup>31</sup>

At that, legitimacy is a fluid concept, but in no way can we claim that Yugoslav communism was always held to be illegitimate by the majority of the population in Yugoslavia. True, the 1945 election was not fair, but Ramiz Crnišanić, Milovan Đilas, and Vladimir Velebit, insiders in 1945, all opined much later that the support was such that the election would be won throughout Yugoslavia).<sup>32</sup> Later, there was even a study on fears of people in Yugoslavia, where,

<sup>30</sup> Slavoljub Đukić, *Političko groblje* (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2009), 144.

<sup>31</sup> Josip Županov, *Samoupravljanje i društvena moć* (Zagreb: Naše teme, 1970).

<sup>32</sup> S. Flere and R. Klanjšek, *The Rise and fall*, 60.



again, the greatest fear was nuclear war and the health of Tito (Ćulibrk and Grebo).<sup>33</sup> Later, as of the 1970s, there was also an abundance of studies none of which indicated an express illegitimacy of the Yugoslav communist state. Not even Županov, the two authors cite, although he found that the system was legitimate, because of valuing egalitarianism (and this, in turn, blocked the needed industrial mentality, according to Županov). Even as late as 1990, when ethnic entrepreneurship had well drilled through the tissue of Yugoslavia, the vast majority of the populace clung to Yugoslavia (opting for it and against republic independences), with a notable exception in Kosovo and a moderate one in Slovenia.<sup>34</sup>

This issue could be dealt with further, but it is very doubtful whether much evidence could be provided that would indicate that the Yugoslav communist state was illegitimate in a majority population of any federal unit (Kosovo being an exception). In any case, the claim by Mihaljević and Miljan remains uncorroborated. It is not even indicated how they would tackle the test of the existence or absence of legitimacy in Yugoslavia.

### The Issue of Dynamism

Mihaljević and Miljan ask that social phenomena, totalitarianism in particular, be allowed to be analyzed dynamically and variably. At the beginning of their paper (225), they maintain that “nothing is static in social development...” In that sense one would expect an analysis of the evolution of totalitarianism in Yugoslavia, reflecting the “dynamic changes and transformations” they speak of. However, in their view, there is nothing dynamic in totalitarianism in Yugoslavia. In spite of various developments, they state that “A totalitarian ideology was imposed on all citizens of Yugoslavia until the breakdown of the system” (229). In our paper, we considered such arguments with analytical vigor. We clearly listed indications which, taken together, demonstrate that almost no trace of totalitarianism, taken in the accepted political-science meaning, remained after the mid-60s. The religious press was plentiful and not censored, religious buildings grew in number (although mostly in rural areas, where the Muslim population showed growth), varied cultural forms effloresced. Political pluralism, however, was in the form of republic interaction and not in the Westminster model. This interaction was abundant, although not usually in front of the public, which would react quickly with unrest.

### Other Issues

Mihaljević and Miljan are flat out wrong on some elementary facts. For example, on page 240 they claim that Janković and Čolaković described “the early seventies” in a book published already in 1964. Moreover, Janković and Čolaković were not able to do so unless they had extra-sensory knowledge, which is beyond empirical

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<sup>33</sup> Svetozar Ćulibrk and Zlata Grebo, *Želje i strahovi naroda Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1965).

<sup>34</sup> S. Flere and R. Klanjšek, *The Rise and fall*, 178–180.

falsification. In fact, Mihaljević and Miljan commit gross negligence in their referencing, all in what seems to be their enthusiastic endeavor to prove their “point”.

On page 227 the authors enter a new typology: instead of the “active” and “passive” freedom known in political philosophy, they speak of a “negative” and “positive” freedom, without explaining how this typology relates to the classical knowledge on freedom and why it should be considered superior.

Polemizing with our assertion that republics had foreign affairs offices, Mihaljević and Miljan boldly claim: “The SRC [Croatia] never had a ministry (secretariat) of foreign affairs” (229). Had they consulted the right sources, they would have found that the Socialist Republic of Croatia adopted a law in 1977 establishing a republic committee for international liaisons, a euphemism for a foreign service<sup>35</sup> but also that this committee continued activities which had previously been carried out by a body with a less illustrious title “professional service of the council of the executive council for foreign relations” (Article 13). In 1977 it was defined to have dealt with “establishing and maintaining relations of the republic with bodies of foreign countries.” Furthermore, the committee was to have “considered issues of relevance for the implementation of foreign policy” (Article 2). Both bodies were headed by an executive council member, i.e. a ministerial level. Of course, all this was within the framework of the SFRY, but we are focusing on what the SFRY was like. In addition, not only did such a body exist in Croatia at the time, but such bodies also operated in the seven other constituent entities of Yugoslavia, including its two provinces. This was all part of the arrangement of 1974, where most claims by nationalist politicians as to fortifying republics and provinces were transformed into the 1971-1974 constitutional arrangement, although most of these politicians were themselves downed. One major exception was the Kosovo claim for republic status, which was not fully adopted and the Kosovo politicians making these claims weathered the purges unharmed. Kosovo’s prerogatives were enlarged, its communication with the federal government became direct (not by way of the Serbian authorities), but the name itself was not changed to republic, the borders of the Serbian republic remained intact, which Nikezić insisted upon (he was known to have spoken “everything but borders may be discussed”). Hoxha, Bakalli (with their aides) remained in power.

Mihaljević and Miljan are also wrong or unaware about their implications. Such republic and provincial institutions, their number and equality in form is well known in scholarship to have produced national “reification,” irrespective of previous national development.<sup>36</sup> In fact, Bunce goes further and speaks about the institutions of socialist/communist federations as working against the center and the federation, even when it seemed that the opposite was true.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> „Zakon o republičkom komitetu za odnose s inozemstvom“, *Narodne novine*, br. 31, 1977, 1–2.

<sup>36</sup> Siniša Malešević, *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 232; Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>37</sup> Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Therefore, we cannot accept the “breakdown of totalitarianism” as the best explanation for the downfall of Yugoslavia. In line with nationalism studies, in our books,<sup>38</sup> we follow the nationalism within the elite (initially only fighting over economic goods), the once united elite's transformation into national elites, the sedimentation of elite nationalism, and finally, the unbridled solicitation of nationalist propaganda and instigation of fear by ethnic entrepreneurs of every kind in the 1980s, when express nationalism, becoming legitimate, pervaded the general public. Fear-mongering was by far the best instrument. Of course, this eventuated within a basic change in the global system, which allowed these radical centrifugal processes to take place.

And although the communist elites believed they were “fighting” against nationalism, their view on “resolving the ethnic question” of their respective ethnicities, led them to fortify the national states and seek autochthonous economies. This is explained fully in our books (2019a, 2019b). In any case, were it not for an interaction of nationalisms, Yugoslavia would probably have transformed into a liberal democracy in whatever form, with the downfall of communism. This is in contrast to Mihaljević and Miljan who do not recognize nationalism in Yugoslavia at all: “[nationalism] is something communist rulers used primarily to define enemies.”<sup>39</sup>

Mihaljević and Miljan also make a rather quick and unsubstantiated judgment of Tito as an apex of totalitarian power. “There was a single person with almost unlimited power” (235). Although Tito's personality and role would demand a special treatment alone, we claim that his role was not the same at all periods, and he still remains an enigma in some aspects. Without considering Goldstein and Goldstein,<sup>40</sup> with their detailed and reliable biography of Tito's rich life, Čavoški,<sup>41</sup> who makes an excellent case for Tito's being a Machiavelist, Kuljić<sup>42</sup> who makes an even better case for his being a modernizer (who also made Yugoslavia an esteemed entity in the world arena), one cannot make claims as simple as those made by Mihaljević and Miljan.

Lastly, Mihaljević and Miljan also make some mistakes of fact and write inconsistently. For example, on page 228 they begin enumerations by writing “firstly” twice (there is no “secondly” in either case), on page 234 there is a sentence, not quite logical, where an “appointment” needs to be “appointed”, on the same page the word “polyarchic” is spelled incorrectly twice, etc. The sheer number of orthographic, syntactic and grammatical errors makes their text hard to read, inconsistent and almost impossible to follow.

In sum, it seems rather futile to discuss such complex issues on Yugoslavia with authors who demonstrate such disregard for facts, rules of scholarship, and ignorance of political science. This, of course, does not mean that

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<sup>38</sup> S. Flere and R. Klanjšek, *Analiza raspada*; S. Flere and R. Klanjšek, *The Rise and fall*.

<sup>39</sup> P. Mihaljević and G. Miljan, *op. cit.*, 229.

<sup>40</sup> Ivo Goldstein and Slavko Goldstein, *Tito* (Zagreb: Profil, 2015).

<sup>41</sup> Kosta Čavoški, *Tito – tehnologija vlasti* (Beograd: Dosije, 1991).

<sup>42</sup> Todor Kuljić, *Tito – sociološkoistorijska studija* (Zrenjanin: Kulturni centar Zrenjanina, 2012).

Yugoslavia should not be studied by historians. However, as in all studies, such research needs to be undertaken without irrational preconceptions into which facts and para-facts are molded forcibly. They should be especially cautious when using typological political science appellations. We shall make no comment on their motivations or extra-scientific objectives (as they did to us), allowing readers to reach their own conclusions.

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#### WHAT TYPOLOGICAL APPELLATION IS SUITABLE FOR TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA: RESPONSE TO MIHALJEVIĆ AND MILJAN

##### *Summary*

This paper discusses the counterfactual, scientifically unfounded and un-scholarly statements by Mihaljević and Miljan in their paper “Was Tito’s Yugoslavia not Totalitarian?” We needed to consider the issues of: Totalitarianism as a scholarly concept and a social construct, which could at best fit Yugoslavia’s political life in the period 1945-1962 (1966). The typological characterization of Tito’s Yugoslavia, where there is substantial agreement among scholars that consociation fits it best (at least for the period beginning in the mid-sixties). Along with numerous authors noted, we find that all elements of a predetermined consociation were present, including the grand coalition at the federal level, decision making at the federal level, the autonomy of units in cultural matters, and other; the organization of security services in Yugoslavia of the period (where we found multiplicity of organizations that did not always operate in harmony), the role of the republics in conducting foreign policy, which kept increasing, contrary to what Mihaljević and Miljan explicitly maintained with respect to Croatia; The monetary policy and seigniorage which came about (particularly explaining inflation of the 1980s). In its endeavor to achieve “settled accounts,” the federal government was stripped of any money issuing, but the money “leaked” into federal and republic national banks, which our critics were completely unaware of, not only making use of a wrong characterization, but also spelling it incorrectly; the issue of the political system’s dynamics (there were very substantial changes in the period 1945-1991). It was primarily a case of increasing decentralization in an attempt to do away with any “apples of discord” in mutual relationships (particularly in the distribution of economic goods), which proved impossible; the issue of the political system’s legitimacy, which is a slippery scientific notion, although its presence in certain forms could well be corroborated. We also noted a number of minor mistakes, errors, and omissions by the authors at issue. We found a general failure by the authors to achieve scientific objectivity and master the notions necessary for analysis.

**KEYWORDS:** Authoritarianism, Josip Broz Tito, Communism, Consociation, Federation, Political System, Totalitarianism, Unitarianism, Yugoslavia