INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES IN TITO’S YUGOSLAVIA 1944–1966

ABSTRACT: The article provides a detailed overview of the Yugoslav intelligence and security services from their inception toward the latter part of World War II and the early stages of the Cold War. It is written based on the partially declassified documented sources of the state security service in the Archives of Yugoslavia and on the in-depth research of the Military Security service sources in the Military Archives in Belgrade, still less known in the domestic scientific public in Serbia and the Former Yugoslavia. The author used literature mostly written by contemporary witnesses from the security services and incorporated facts gathered in several interviews with senior security officials.

KEYWORDS: Yugoslavia, State Security, Counterintelligence Service, Josip Broz Tito, Aleksandar Ranković, OZNA, UDBA, KOS

As with the other communist-governed states, socialist Yugoslavia had a broadly developed state and military security apparatus in the period of its existence (1945–1992). It originated from the pre-World War II illegal Communist Party activities and the resistance Partisan movement activities in 1941–1945. Similar to the Soviet experiences, the Yugoslav security apparatus was regarded as “a sword of the revolution” and explained as the “most revolutionary and most fighting institution for preserving the great achievements of our Revolution.”

OZNA - The Department for People's Protection

All of Yugoslavia’s security services developed from a single service: The Department for the People's Protection (locally known as: OZNA, Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda). The OZNA was formed in the Bosnian town of Drvar on 13 May 1944. At that time, the town served as the command center of the Partisan Main Staff with Marshal Tito and the Allied and Soviet liaison missions. On 15 August 1944, the People’s Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (Korpus narodne
odbrane Jugoslavije - KNOJ) was formed. It was an interior-purpose military force, whose members carried out tasks at the orders of the OZNA representatives on the ground. It was a kind of interior army. The role of the OZNA and KNOJ was to purge the so-called “enemies of the people” in the last days of the war and set up interior affairs organizations in all the Yugoslav republics, following their liberation.2

This service was headed by Aleksandar Ranković, one of Tito’s closest collaborators. He was known among the members of the security services by his nom de guerre “Marko.” Ranković was a member of the Partisan Supreme Headquarters and of the Central Committee, the highest ruling body of the Yugoslav Communist Party, previously tasked with organizational and personnel issues. Although the six future republics had not been confirmed politically or administratively, each of their local OZNA departments were been placed under the authority of the local communist leaders, who already had pre-war connections with the Soviet services, or their connections had become renewed through their wartime partisan experience in combating the “enemies of the people.” Such figures were prominent Communist Party members from certain regions, who had already dealt with security issues: Ivan Krajačić “Stevo” in Croatia, Slobodan Penesić “Krcun” in Serbia, Ivan Maček “Matija” in Slovenia, etc. All of them remained in charge or maintained a dominant influence in the post-war decades on the functioning of the security apparatus in “their” respective republics.

It would appear that the OZNA for Croatia, which was among the first-established regional OZNAs, had a certain level of autonomy from Ranković’s control, since it was run by Ivan Stevo Krajačić, Tito’s close collaborator from the days of the communist party's illegal pre-war activities and operations and a man who had good personal relations with the Soviet services.3

When combating their enemies in the civil war that raged in occupied Yugoslavia, Tito and his close associates relied more heavily on their pre-war illegal communist experiences than merely following the Soviet model. This was especially apparent in the western province of Slovenia, where the local communist intelligence established its own Security intelligence service (Varnostno-obveščevalna služba) in 1942, which later simply merged into the OZNA structure.4 But regardless of the local flavor and experience of the Yugoslav partisan security services, the Yugoslavs did receive a few Soviet advisors in 1944. With the OZNA there was a Colonel Timofeyev from the NKVD, while Colonel Melynikov and Orlov were advisors with the Intelligence Department of the Partisan Main Staff, with the task of “helping and assisting in the organization of the work.”5

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2 Vojni arhiv Ministarstva odbrane (Military Archive of the Ministry of Defence, Belgrade, further as: VA), fond Vojnobezbednosna agencija (Military Security Agency, further as: VBA), k.17, 6.3.03.3, s. br.37 and s. br. 38.
Depending on the situation in the different parts of occupied Yugoslavia under Partisan control, the OZNA developed its structures in the second half of 1944 and through the end of the war in 1945. The entering of the Soviet Army into Serbia (the eastern parts of Yugoslavia) in late September and the liberation of the capital city of Belgrade on 20 October 1944 was an important step in the Communist takeover of power in Yugoslavia. It enabled taking firm control of political affairs, eliminating the “people’s enemies” of all kinds in central Serbia and Vojvodina, and the widespread development of the OZNA structure.6

The organizational structure of the OZNA was defined at the meeting of its leading figures in liberated Belgrade on 31 October 1944. At that meeting, the structure of the OZNA was adopted for the forthcoming days of the post-war period. This service included the Military Counterintelligence branch as its “Third Component” (department), until the constitutional changes in the spring of 1946. This department had five sections tasked with: countering foreign intelligence, counterintelligence in the army units, communications, and economic and technical issues.7

One of the unique features of the organizational structure in the period from late 1944 through most of 1945, was the existence of the OZNA za Beograd (for Belgrade), as a separate and independent department, under the direct authority of the head of the OZNA and with a status equal to the OZNA departments in the Yugoslav republics. The importance of Belgrade as Yugoslavia’s capital city, had led to establishing this department, which conducted the arrogation of occupation and pre-war police files and the elimination of the different “people’s enemies” in the period of its existence.8

OZNA improved its potentials with training and added ideological impact from similar Soviet services. In addition to around 3,000 army personnel trained in Soviet military academies and schools between 1944 and 1948, a total of 29 members from the OZNA department and departments of each republic were sent to the NKVD academy in Moscow. After completing a six-month training program, they returned home, where they organized further training courses for the other members of the service.9

One of the most important methods learned in Moscow was the method of “covering,” which meant that there should be one OZNA operative for every 10 citizens and that agents should be planted in every state institution, including ministries, lower-ranking institutions, firms, and factories.10

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7 VA, VBA, k. 54, 7.2.s. br. 25, 120; Ibid, k. 20, f. 8.
8 B. Dimitrijević, „Formiranje OZN-e…“., 9–28; К. Николић и Б. Димитријевић, „Озна против ‘народних непријатеља’…“, 155–168.
9 VA, VBA, k. 8, f.1.
10 Бошко Матић, Крцун, Животопис Слободана Пенезића Крцуна (Горњи Милановац: Дечије новине, 1983), 188–189.
Reorganization in 1946: Creation of the UDBA and KOS

After the first constitutional changes in the spring of 1946, the OZNA split into two parts: The Department for State Security (known as UDBA, *Uprava državne bezbednosti*) and the Counterintelligence Service in the Yugoslav Army (KOS - *Kontraobaveštajna služba*). The head of the KOS was Colonel Jefto Šašić, who was the chief of the III Department of the OZNA from its inception in 1944. Later promoted to the rank of general, Šašić remained in power until 1964, becoming almost a synonym for the KOS and military security affairs among the wider Yugoslav public. Formally, the head of the KOS was subordinated to the assistant minister for the people’s defense, who was tasked with ideological and Communist Party organizational work inside the Yugoslav Army. In addition to this service, as of 1944, the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army had its II Department, which carried out different military intelligence operations throughout the entire period of its existence. It was a separate military service, but not tasked or involved in Yugoslav internal issues.

According to its initial organization, the KOS had the following structure:
- departments at the level of the Ministry of the People’s Defense and army, air force, and navy headquarters, and the KNOJ;
- sections at the level of divisions and similar level headquarters, and
- subsections in brigades, regiments, military schools, and military enterprises.
Lower-level units have designated KOS officers or NCOs. Since the beginning of 1948, all of the KOS organizational structures received the number XII (12) as a prefix. This number remained as a kind of synonym for the whole service.

There were no major organizational or functional changes inside the UDBA. The military counterintelligence was now established as a separate service (KOS). The remaining UDBA departments were organized in the following order:
I – foreign intelligence activities;
II – interior enemies (“enemies of the people”);
III – counterintelligence activities;
IV – communications and all other activities devoted to controlling postal, telephone, and telegraph usage; usage of technical equipment in UDBA activities;
V – material and finance affairs.

Later, more UDBA departments were added, such as:
VI – protection of the highest state and party leaders;

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11 VA, VBA, k.54, 7.2. sv. br. 25, 120. *General Jefto Šašić*.
14 VA, VBA, kl.0.01.01 f. 1 and 4.
VII – cryptographic protection and usage of cyphers; 
VIII – staffing and organization.15

In addition to the federal level (UDBA za Jugoslaviju), each of the six Yugoslav republics now had their internal affairs ministries, with the UDBA department, the department of internal affairs, and headquarters of the People's Militia (Police).16 All the UDBAs in the republics replicated the structure of the federal UDBA, but on a lower organizational level. This kind of organizational structure remained in place for the next two decades, until the changes in 1966. The first three UDBA departments were treated as “basic” and “core.” Some new departments were added later, such as IX to XII, etc., and the departments grew from the level of Odeljenje (section) to the level of Uprava (administration) around 1961.17

It is interesting to note, that the OZNA and its later successor the UD-BA, was headed by the Interior Ministry, and the interior ministries in the Yugoslav republics. But, although it the service focused on interior affairs, it was subordinated to the Defense Ministry. Its budget was included in the defense budget; its members had military ranks and wore uniforms. The system of training was through army-style courses. Moreover, it used the so-called military post number system for hiding the real titles of some subordinated units and organizations. It was quite an unusual dualism.

Combating Internal Enemies

The entire period of the existence of the OZNA (1944–1946), was characterized by improvisation and usage of unlawful practices, including occasional mass killings, in its work against the “enemies of the people.” With the notion of having conducted the “revolution,” all the OZNA members, from top to bottom, were ruthless and merciless toward many of the local anti-communist forces, POWs, prominent local figures who did not support the Communists, prosperous individuals that possessed different wealth, and of course all kinds of representatives of the Church, no matter which religion. This period was also characterized by the strong presence of armed anti-communist groups operating in central Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. Some of them represented a serious challenge to the new communist authorities. In combating them, the OZNA, supported by the units of the KNOJ, executed the captured “outlaws” without any additional investigations or trials, including sometimes even the civilian accomplices of these “outlaws.”18

Most of those atrocities remained hidden throughout the period of socialist Yugoslavia until recent times. A published series of documents from Croatia and Slovenia in the past decade testifies to the ruthless activities of the OZNA in

18 VA, fond Narodnooslobodilačka vojska, k. 771A, 15/4 and k. 772, 31/4.
Such a style of merciless UDBA operation was continued with the conducting of the new agrarian policy, in the so-called “socialist transformation of the rural areas,” “collectivization” and the “fight against the kulaks.”

By late 1946 and 1947, the UDBA defined some of its work strategies, objectives of its operational activities and interests. It also defined the typology and categories of the public figures that were against the Communist regime based on their pre-World War II behavior.

In the period up to the summer of 1948, the UDBA - State Security - dealt with all kind of “enemies of the people” in the civilian life of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Those were the members and supporters of the defeated anti-communist political and military formations and institutions in the first two peace-time years, 1945 and 1946. In that “struggle,” the UDBA started to develop an extensive network of collaborators. Upon some initial guidelines for operational work, the UDBA intended to have three kinds of collaborators: informer – secret collaborator, which was the lowest but basic kind. The network of informers was run by handlers, who maintained liaison with many informers and gave them instructions and tasks. Finally, there were the agents, who were qualified UDBA operatives inside the “enemy” environment. They were the most important element in this network of collaborators. All of the UDBA collaborators were enlisted in the protocol log book and agents have their dossiers with their coded names and pseudonyms, while the detailed facts on the real person were in separate files. Usually the gathered information was passed on to the analysts, who were the officials in charge of various subjects and matters of interest, who analyzed and processed the information and gave evaluations to their superiors. Such information was dispatched through the different kinds of reports and bulletins to the head of the service, ministry, government, and to Tito himself.

In 1947, the “Guidelines for the work on investigation” of the UDBA were approved by the Interior Ministry. These guidelines enabled the UDBA agents to take police measures: arresting, interrogation, and further investigation of those people who had fallen into its hands. The UDBA was authorized to open dossiers with details of the cases of certain individuals. With such approvals for its work the Yugoslav UDBA unexpectedly entered 1948, a year that brought a watershed, a dispute between Tito and Stalin that was to change the political destiny of Yugoslavia.

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21 М. Лопушина, *н. д.*, 63–64.


Unexpected Challenge in 1948: Clash with Stalin and His Supporters

The 1948 break with the Soviet Union and the other Cominform members occurred after months of hidden correspondence between the Yugoslav and Soviet political ruling circles. The Resolution of the Cominform, with heavy accusations against Tito and his “clique,” was issued from Moscow on 28 June 1948. Both services (UDBA and KOS) saw the approaching clash almost a month and a half before it went public. To the Yugoslav security services UDBA and KOS this came as a major blow, not just because yesterday's brothers-in-arms had now become bitter enemies, but because both services were deeply rooted in the Soviet model, methodology, practice and training. But the Communist party organizations inside the army and the security services had not been informed and were not prepared to take a firm ideological stand. Nobody expected this clash to grow into such a large-scale conflict.24

Both services combined their efforts in combating all pro-Stalin or pro-Soviet activities in Yugoslavia. Especially difficult was controlling the parts of the officer corps within the Army. The Counterintelligence Service had the serious task of controlling the numerous army members that had previously been trained in the Soviet Union, ranging from NCOs and cadets all the way up to General Arso Jovanović, the Chief of the General Staff, who was killed in an alleged attempt to cross the border into Romania in the summer of 1948.25

Both services developed mechanisms and widened their structure and organization in society. Since the conflict was on-going for an unpredictable time, federal-level UDBA became responsible for running the intelligence operations against the neighboring Communist countries. The intention was to control any likely security threats or preempt a possible attack against the Yugoslav state and combat Soviet and people’s democracy propaganda and occasional incursions and raids along the borders.

The sudden change of Yugoslavia’s foreign environment led to improvements in UDBA practices. In this period, between 1949 and 1954, the UDBA developed the unique organizational structure of the Intelligence Center (Obaveštajni centar) and Sub-centers (Obaveštajni podcentar). The centers were in the structure of I (intelligence) Department of the UDBA za Jugoslaviju, headed by Edo Brajnik “Štefan,” a Slovenian member of the Communist Party and illegal Partisan intelligence in that province. Intelligence centers were operational units created to run intelligence operations against Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. Usually, intelligence centers were organized in larger administrative

24 Author’s interview with Colonel Bude Bosnić (at that time in the I Department of the Federal UDBA) Belgrade 1997; Author’s interview with Vladan Bojanjić (at that time head of the II Department of the Serbian UDBA), Belgrade 1995; AJ 507, VII, k.14/1, p. 8.
centers (such as Niš, Novi Sad, Osijek, etc.), while sub-centers were in towns close to the border (Senta, Subotica, etc.). The main task of these centers was gathering intelligence, propaganda activities, and infiltration of agents and coordination with the border units of the KNOJ. It was standard practice for UDBA officers, regardless of rank, who were deployed in centers and especially in sub-centers, to use different names to cover their identities.26

In 1949, the School for (basic) training of cadres of UDBA za Jugoslaviju was created in a residential part of Belgrade’s Topčider district. It carried the undercover designation VP 1652. The participants in the training were chosen among members of the Communist party or its youth branch, the SKOJ, always with a communist or partisan family background. They had two years of training based on a combination of military and police knowledge. In a military sense, the course was equal to the one taught at the Infantry School in Sarajevo, but the cadets had courses in sabotage, diversion, and reconnaissance training, including around 20 parachute jumps. At the end of the course they were promoted into rank of Second Lieutenant and posted on duties all over Yugoslavia.27 In addition to this basic school, another school entitled Higher School (for party and UDBA cadres) was established to provide advanced training in higher education for the UDBA cadres.28

On the other hand, there was the need to overcome problems in the functioning of daily life under the political and economic embargo imposed since 1948. To offset the economic embargo, the UDBA za Jugoslaviju set up a secret organization in 1949 to handle economic trade and contraband trade for the UDBA and the federal government. This organization operated even later, until 1963, after the political and economic situation had been resolved.29 The UDBA organizations in the republics also followed this practice. For example, in 1949, the UDBA za Makedoniju established a special secret money fund inside its II department. It was done along the model of the “Yugoslav UDBA” as Cvetko Uzunovski, the head of the Macedonian UDBA, explained later. He said that it had developed into a whole “section for black market trade.” They worked on smuggling opium and cigarettes from abroad. Then they sold the goods to the federal UDBA or the UDBA for Slovenia, since the Macedonian UDBA was not able to export those goods to the West. With money obtained in this way, the UDBA for Macedonia purchased all of their vehicles, vehicles for all of the subordinated local UDBA detachments in this republic, vehicles for “war-time reserve” and complete communication equipment for its IV department.30

The Cominform situation led to the establishment of a counterintelligence service within the People’s Militia by the beginning of 1949 at the orders

26 Author’s interview with Nikola Nikolić (at that time with Intelligence Sub-center in Senta, I Department of the Federal UDBA), Belgrade July 2017; Arso Milatović, Pet diplomatskih misija (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1985).
27 Interview with N. Nikolić.
30 AJ, 507, k. 9, The Case of the Cvetko Uzunovski, 18.
of A. Ranković, the federal minister for internal affairs. This service (department) was assigned the number IX (9), as its prefix, and was part of the People’s Militia headquarters inside the federal and republic interior ministries. The IX counterintelligence departments were created within the federal and republic departments of the People’s Militia. They subordinated the sections and teams for counterintelligence protection of the Militia.

The task of this service was to monitor and check the ideological positions of militia officers, because there were cases when some of them had opted for the Cominform, helped illegal networks of supporters, or even defected to the Cominform countries. The counterintelligence conducted security checks and investigations, and the “tougher” cases were turned over to the military prosecution and courts for further processing. It was estimated that this service had managed to scale down “enemy operations” within the structure of the Militia to a very low level. This service was disbanded in late 1952, “since it was felt that there was no further need for its existence.”

The period between 1949 and 1953 was the high point of security activities of both Yugoslav services, the UDBA and the KOS. After Stalin's death in March of 1953 and Yugoslavia's siding with the United States and NATO, the pressure from the East was eased. It led to changes in both security services: major downsizing of personnel and a certain de-brutalization of the UDBA's methods, which had been part of the fight against Soviet supporters in the previous period.

**Criticism of the UDBA's Harsh Methods**

Emerging numbers of pro-Stalin or pro-Soviet individuals, who were arrested in late 1948 and early 1949, led to the creation of detention camps. According to some statements by members of the Federal UDBA, the initial idea was to use the converted women's prison in Požarevac, in northeastern Serbia for all of those who had opted for the Soviets and their Information Bureau. But after a group of non-political inmates managed to escape from this prison, the decision was made to set up a prison/camp on an isolated island in the Adriatic Sea.

Works on Goli Otok (Desolate Island) in the Adriatic started in the first half of 1949. The first group of inmates - Cominform supporters - arrived at the island on 9 July 1949. There were other prisons or camps for those who opted for the Cominform, such as Stara Gradiška prison or the military barracks in Bileća. Some of them passed through several of those camps during their terrible voyage.

The Federal UDBA had the task of running this notorious camp at the Goli Otok, but it is still unclear for which responsibilities it was subordinated.
and to whom. It was known as the “Marble Enterprise” (*Preduzeće Mermer*) or under its code number VP 3234.36

Although rebuked by the Cominform press for the existence of such camps (“The horror of Desolate Island”), mostly reviled by those who defected to the East later, Yugoslavia firmly denied its existence at the time.37 When Tito re-established good relations with the Western Allies and started to receive military aid in late 1951, there were no comments or complains by the West regarding this method of coping with the Stalinist opposition. On the other hand, every one of the released inmates was warned not to speak about the existence of the Goli otok camp upon their return to normal life.38

The visit of Ranković, Stefanović and other UDBA and party officials to the Goli Otok camp in late 1951 resulted in some improvements of the prisoners' living conditions.39 Further changes were announced before the IV Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) in 1952, in an article by General Filip Bajković, assistant in the Federal Interior Ministry, published in the party magazine *Komunist* (*The Communist*).40 This article was a kind of introduction to what Minister Aleksandar Ranković said on this Plenum warning that the UDBA should “not stand above the government or above the law.” He criticized the policy of arresting, stating that “47% of the arrests in Yugoslavia in 1949 had not been justified…” and also the inclination of the UDBA to assume the responsibilities of other institutions in society.41 This was an unusual event. The founder and number one man of the service had issued strong criticism of its activities. This process led to abandoning the practice of the UDBA influencing investigations, court decisions and independent tendencies of its members in daily practice.

Ranković’s criticism was a pretext for structural changes of the UDBA in 1952. On 26 June 1952, Rankovković publically stated that the UDBA had been “converted to a civilian formation.” This meant its transfer from the Defense Ministry to the Interior Ministry, abolishing military ranks and uniforms for its members. This was confirmed by Tito’s decree on 25th October of that very same year. Other documents followed, regarding the titles of positions inside the UDBA ranks, recognition of educational background and training related no longer to military ranks and especially wages, which now threatened to be less

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36 This code number confirmed with the personnel documents of Asen Stefanov, who left the camp in 1954. Courtesy by Srdan Cvetković.
40 Filip Bajković, „UBDA u sistemu socijalističke demokratije“, *Komunist*, br. 1, (1951), 57–82.
41 Aleksandar Ranković, „Za dalje jačanje pravosuda i zakonitosti“, *Vojnopolitički glasnik*, br. 6, (1951).
than in the military.\textsuperscript{42} Financing of the UDBA remained in 1953 through the Defense Ministry budget, but in the wake of constant complains by the army top-brass, it was finally transferred to the federal and republic interior ministries in 1954.\textsuperscript{43} The transfer of the budget would also influence the downsizing of the UDBA, which occurred in 1954/55.\textsuperscript{44}

At the orders of Aleksandar Ranković in 1952, all illegal trade previously conducted by federal and republic UDBAs was to cease, and such activities business were to be transferred to the economic councils of each republic, especially trade activities linked to opium and cigarettes.\textsuperscript{45}

On the other hand, the Goli Otok camp remained a destination for all of the Cominform supporters until the end of the struggle with Soviets and the Cominform. At the Federal Government's interior policy council on 25 June 1953, Svetislav Stefanović explained that the “question of using the protective measure of sending people to a place named Marble Enterprise” should be revised, since the number of individuals opting for the Cominform (Soviets) had declined. It was the first step toward changing the purpose of the camp at Goli Otok.\textsuperscript{46}

On 12 May 1954, marking the tenth anniversary of the Yugoslav security services, Svetislav Stefanović summarized the death toll of all the services and branches involved in defending Tito’s Yugoslavia since 1945: 548 members of the KNOJ, 337 members of the People’s Militia, 85 members of the OZNA/UDBA and 17 border guards.\textsuperscript{47}

\textbf{Foreign Intelligence and Technical Improvements}

The heroic phase of the UDBA was over. The service sailed into calmer waters. Now it had to conduct foreign intelligence and take care of internal enemies in a much different fashion.

In 1952 a new Intelligence Service was formed in the Foreign Affairs Ministry from the I Department of the UDBA. This department of the UDBA, which was tasked with foreign intelligence, was taken out from its structure and placed inside the Foreign Ministry. It was located on the fourth floor of the Foreign Ministry and became known in intelligence slang as “the Fourth Floor.” Its first head was Veljko Mićunović, a leading communist from Montenegro and later ambassador to Moscow. This was the first step in creating Yugoslavia's foreign intelligence service. It was a service with the size of a department, so it became known as the Service or Department for Information and Documentation (\textit{Služba} or \textit{Uprava za informacije i dokumentaciju}, SID or UID). There were around 150 staff in the late 1950-ties in this service. It became responsible for the network of

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Borba}, 26. 7. 1952, 1–2; \textit{Službeni vojni list}, br. 9, (1953), 281.
\textsuperscript{43} AJ, 130–992, Minutes from the meeting, 29. IX 1953.
\textsuperscript{44} AJ, 507, VII, k. 9, The case of Cvetko Uzunovski, 15.
\textsuperscript{45} AJ, 130–992, Minutes from the meeting, 25. VI 1953, 13.
\textsuperscript{46} „Deset godina UDB-e“, \textit{Narodna milicija}, br. 5, (1954), 16–27.
the operatives inside Yugoslav embassies worldwide. It also had an analytical service, which produced reports, information and analyses for its ministry and the highest representatives of Yugoslav politics. Through the years it also developed monitoring and operations against the different Yugoslav anti-communist emigrants. Some of the prominent UDBA cadres were transferred to this service.48

In late 1950s, SID as the Yugoslav foreign intelligence service, ran different kinds of operations obtaining different diplomatic information operating in Europe and overseas. Important capitals such as Washington, Moscow, Paris and London have the largest SID stations numbering up to six members. The European centers like Vienna, Prague, and Athens had up to four, while one or two SID operatives were stationed in other Yugoslav embassies. It made a total of up to 115 foreign operatives in the end of the 1950s. This service also monitored Yugoslav emigrants and economic issues in the host countries. According to Anton Duhaček, a prominent SID official of Czech origin, the ratio of the subjects of the SID work was: 3 (emigration): 2 (foreign politics): 1 (economics).49 It also handled counterintelligence protection and security checks for members of the Foreign Ministry, especially for duties in the diplomatic service. It is worth noting that some of the earliest prominent OZNA/UDBA cadres were send to diplomatic missions abroad as a kind of reward for their previous service.50

Closer linking with the NATO allies, led not only to the process of debrutalization of the Yugoslav services, but also resulted in an improvement in the technical equipment of its structure. Generally, the UDBA did not have much technical experience in its work. The first wiretapping operations were recorded in 1947, when the Slovenian UDBA started using professional wiretapping equipment. In October of 1954, the wiretapping and surveillance service was created within the XII department of the UDBA za Jugoslaviju. This service organized different operations of bugging diplomatic residences, “which were suspected of acting as points of foreign intelligence.” The other task was listening to the “enemies of the people,” which were under the “operational work” of the UDBA’s I, II, or III departments. Those three departments made up the core and were responsible for agent operations and were the only departments that could order the wiretapping of certain suspects or persons of interest. The XII department was only the implementation branch. The “legal” part of the XII Department was tapping important meetings and gatherings of the Yugoslav state or party meetings, or their foreign guests. Pending on the approval of political circles with Tito at the top, this service spread the wiretap devices and installations in a large number of state and party institutions, residences of the foreign diplomatic guests, and even in Tito’s residences.51 Later, in 1966, this practice would be used as a reason for political accusations, attacks and the reorganization of the Federal UDBA.

49 A. Duhaček, n. d., 130.
Following the good results of creating a secret economic and trade establishment, in the mid-1950s, it was decided that the UDBA should support the creation of different trade companies with the intention of developing and pursuing foreign trade, where some benefit would be diverted for secret purposes of the service. For example, such companies were “Genex” in Serbia and “Astra” in Croatia. In other republics there were other companies and enterprises. They were engaged in foreign trade of different and lucrative goods, obtaining items and products that were not available in Yugoslavia, as well as foreign currency, all for the government and the UDBA itself.52

On the other hand, the total numbers of employees in the ranks of the UDBA were mostly overrated in the public. However, exact figures still remain unrevealed, but we have approximations ranging from 13,000 in the early 1950s to some 7,000 by the end of 1955. This downsizing was mostly influenced by the shift of the UDBA from a military to a civilian organization and after the clash with the Soviet Union and the other Cominform countries had come to a close. In 1960 the total amount of employees in the Federal Interior Ministry was 3,864 - half of them being agents of the UDBA za Jugoslaviju.53

On April 196154, the level of UDBA detachments was upgraded from Odeljenje to Uprava (loose translation in English could be from department to directorate). First three departments (uprava) remained the same, only enlarged, while the I Uprava received a new Special Operational Unit (Posebna operativna jedinica) for humint (human intelligence) surveillance. The IV Uprava combined all of the technical services: the IV and XII departments, the technical institute and included: cryptography, ciphering, counter-radio service with goniometric and tapping stations all over the state, tapping and control of telephone and wire communications. The heads of those new Upravas could be also posted as assistants to the Federal Interior Ministry, while the chief of the Federal UDBA held the position of Deputy Minister (as of 1953).55

By the beginning of 1962, the UDBA brought up a confidential classification of main points of interest and activities that were monitored in society. They numbered a total of 37 different activities that ranged from classic “enemy” activities and espionage to monitoring culture, science, local institutions, etc.56

Changes in the Military Counterintelligence

In 1955, the Counterintelligence Service or the XII Department of the Defense Ministry was renamed and transformed into the Military Security Service (Služba bezbednosti), with the establishing of the Military Police (Vojna

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52 S. Cvetković, n. d., 121; Славко Зечевић, Сећања и казивања (Београд: Публикум, 2004), 236.
54 This organisation change could happen earlier. The author has no strict date confirmation.
policija). With this reorganization a Security Training Center was created on 17 November 1955, in the town of Pančevo. The purpose of the Center was to train all active and reserve agents for military security service and military police duty. The Training Center was directly subordinated to the head of the Military Security Service.

There was a total of 2,387 members of the Military Security in 1956. In each of the four military districts (equal to war-time armies) in which the Yugoslav ground forces were organized, there were around 340 members of the service, while in the Yugoslav Air Force and Navy their numbers ranged between 160 and 190. Other members of the Service were among the border units, the military industry, in the security training center, and in the department of the service itself. The major organizational changes that occurred in the Yugoslav People’s Army in 1959 reduced the size of the service to a total of 1,952, including 1,318 officers, 585 NCOs and 48 military personnel. Expressed in percentages, comparing the total numbers within the JNA, the Service had 3.52% officers, 1.57% NCOs and 0.98% military personnel.

In May of 1960, the structure of the Military Security service was improved by creating subordinated units: Counterintelligence Detachments (Kontrabaveštajni detašmani). The Main Counterintelligence Detachment was in Belgrade, while other detachments were in the headquarters of the Army, Air Force, Navy and corps sized Military Districts. Those new security establishments had territorial responsibilities, which was an innovation. This was treated as laying the groundwork for “offensive counterespionage,” as the KOS authorities had estimated. On the other hand, the UDBA officials criticized this practice perceiving this organizational improvement as a duplication and interference in their work. In this period, inside the Yugoslav People’s Army, a coordination body was created for cooperation between the Military Security and Military Intelligence services. The military intelligence service within the General Staff also created its own counter-intelligence section with the intention of protecting its activities from foreign services.

From “Sword of the Revolution” to “Bureaucratic Obstacle” of Yugoslav Society

The 20th anniversary of the Yugoslav security and intelligence service was celebrated on 13 May 1964. Members of all the services were decorated, speeches were held stressing the importance of the work of the services in the past two decades. Tito, as the Yugoslav president and Ranković as the vice-

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57 VA, VBA, k. 10, 6.3.02. sv. br. 21 and sv. 24.
58 Ministarstvo odbrane, Sektor za ljudske resurse, Uprava za organizaciju (Ministry of Defence Republic of Serbia/MoD, Human Resources Sector/HRS, The Department for Organisation/DfO), Naredba III uprave GŠ JNA pov. br. 1799, 17. XI 1955; VA, VBA, k. 6, sv. 1, 70.
59 VA, fond VBA, k.32, 7.1.01, sv.br.4.
61 С. Ковач и И. Поповић Григоров, Војна служба безбедности у Србији.....
president, received delegations of all of the services. It seemed that nothing could challenge or change the position and importance of the security services in Yugoslav society, and their leading figures.

But politics again brought a surprise. By the beginning of the 1960s, Tito was unsure about Yugoslavia's future path. His sharp public addresses in 1962 showed all of his dilemmas and anger. It is certain that in the first period 1962–1964, Tito counted on Ranković (who had become Yugoslavia's vice-president according to the new Constitution in 1963) to promote a more centralist policy and to “discipline” the loose republican leadership. But it turned out that Ranković was not willing or even able to fulfill Tito’s expectations. Then, after the VIII congress of the SKJ in 1964, Tito changed his course and turned to the Croatian and Slovene party leaderships, which were much more eager to promote a confederate future Yugoslav system. Tito realized that Ranković and his State Security legacy would become an obstacle to this political course.

It is difficult to judge when Tito decided to remove Ranković from power, but he definitely did it between mid-1964 and June of 1966. Although not having formal control over the security services, Ranković was perceived as the man who actually controlled the services and had the personal loyalty of its chiefs. Backed by the leadership of the two western republics, and moreover by their UDBAs, Tito managed in this period to change the main figures of the KOS: General Šašić (1964), the Federal Interior Ministry (UDBA): Vojin Lukić (1965), and his adjutant and chief of personal security General Luka Božović (1966). The pretext for Ranković’s dismissal was invented, most likely, by Ivan "Stevo" Krajačić, the head the Croatian UDBA. Ranković would be accused of illegal surveillance and wire-tapping of Tito and his wife Jovanka. Furthermore, Edo Brajnik, assistant federal interior minister, produced a long report to Tito, accusing Ranković and Stefanović for the situation in the Ministry and the Federal UDBA. Prior to the launching of the accusations, a small team of the IV Department of the Croatian UDBA reached Tito’s residence at Belgrade’s Dedinje suburb district, to convert telephone lines so that they should appear as being used in Ranković’s wiretapping of Tito.

On 16 June 1966, Tito summoned the members of the Central Committee, together with Ranković, and pronounced the accusations against him. It was a shock for the long-standing head of security, and it came as a total surprise to him. Ranković’s comrades from the Central Committee were in unison in their critiques and accusations against him. On the very same day, Tito ordered an investigation

63 For in-depth information on the whole affair see: Светко Ковач, Бојан Димитријевић и Ирена Поповић Григоров, Случај Ранковић: из архива КОС-а, 1. и 2. издание (Београд: МЦ Одбрана, 2014/2015) and the Croatian issue with the same title published by Despot Infinitus, Zagreb 2016.
64 S. Numić, n. d., 500.
65 VA, VBA, reg. br. 7.1.04, sv. 137, 47–54; I. Dragović, n. d., 65–69 (according to the Gavro Dotlić, Rasipništvo i zloupotrebe Josipa i Jovanka (Beograd: ABC product, 1990)).
on the alleged wiretapping. A Party committee was formed, which conducted the investigation on a “political” level within the UDBA and Tito’s personnel Security Detachment. Another service, the military security - KOS - had the main responsibility for the investigation of the UDBA’s technical activities. The new head of this service, General Ivan Mišković was eager to carry out Tito’s orders and confirm that Ranković and the UDBA were indeed responsible for the wiretapping.

At the IV Plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Alliance at the island of Brioni, on 1 July 1966, Ranković was publically accused of being responsible for the illegal wiretapping of Tito and others from the Central Committee of the SKJ. In addition to Ranković, the UDBA was harshly criticized for rising above the state and party structures. Even worse, that it had established control over the highest state and political authorities, by bugging their conversations. Aleksandar Ranković was removed from political power and later expelled from the Communist Party, as was as Svetislav Stefanović, his former deputy from the OZNA/UDBA period. Contrary to Ranković, who suffered a light heart attack prior to the session, Stefanović staunchly defended himself and the UDBA in front of Tito and the others at the Brioni session.

**Purges in the Security Services as the Outcome of the Brioni Plenum Decisions**

During the summer and autumn of 1966, massive investigations were conducted in the UDBA at the federal, Serbian and Belgrade levels. The persons from the IV Department of the Federal UDBA and Belgrade UDBA responsible for the wiretapping and other surveillance measures, were jailed and questioned in order to give their signed confessions proving their intention to wiretap Tito. This included Former Serbian and Federal Interior Minister Vojin Lukić and Assistant Federal Interior Minister Selim Numić, who had been in charge of all of the UDBA’s “wiretapping” for dozens of years in the past. Regardless of the pressure on Numić and the other operatives, nothing was extracted from them and in late November Tito decided to proclaim an abolition of Ranković, Stefanović, Lukić and the other imprisoned UDBA operatives. The political side of the affair was over. Although nothing was discovered, the accusations remained.

The affair then continued as a reorganization of the intelligence and security services. A document titled: “Thesis for the Reorganization of the Service of State Security” was launched in mid-September and became the foundation for the further reorganization of the State Security. It was decided that the

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68 VA, VBA, reg. no. 7.1.04, sv. 137, 1, 23–24.
70 AJ, 212-18, Izveštaj o deformacijama u radu Službe državne bezbednosti.
73 S. Numić, n. d., 331–332.
UDBA should change its name to State Security Service - SDB (Služba državne bezbednosti). At the federal level only, those branches intended for coordination remained. All other tasks were transferred to the SDBs in the republics, which now assumed the basic responsibilities for operative security and intelligence work. Being recognized as the core of bureaucracy and conservatism, the SDB of Serbia was also downscaled, while the regional SDBs of Vojvodina and Kosovo become much more independent.

The wave of investigations also affected the foreign intelligence - SID. The SID was also downscaled, losing its previous importance in favor of the SDBs in the republics, which now received approval to establish foreign intelligence missions based on evaluations of the leaderships in the republics.

All the changes were approved by the new Interior Affairs Law, which outlined the changes in the Yugoslav intelligence and security sector for decades to come. Instead of one strong security service, now it had been decentralized to the status of eight local and one federal service. The Federal SDB remained with the task of coordinating and controlling the republic SDBs and gathering information and carrying out operations only of importance for Yugoslavia in general.

In the second half of 1966 and the beginning of 1967, large numbers of UDBA employees were dismissed from service. In the federal service over 700 people were laid off. According to SDB documents from the end of 1967, the Federal Ministry had 934 employees, among them only 342 in the Federal State Security, and out of that number, only 184 were marked as “operatives.” The downsizing continued in the late 1960-ties. In contrast, this process was different in the SDBs in the Yugoslav republics, which started to scale up their ranks with new cadres.

Finally, a revision of the archives and documents was carried out in the period between 1968 and 1969. This led to a downsizing of the SDB archives, explained as being part of the “de-bureaucratization” process. It is worth noting that on 1 July 1966 - the day when the Brioni Plenum was held, which marked the last days of Ranković’s UDBA - there were 2,754,923 personal dossiers in the archive! This fact shows that 12% of the total, or 35% of the “actively working population” of Yugoslavia, was monitored, in one way or another, by the State Security Service. Those figures could be taken to represent the level of totalitarianism and the notion of the “internal” enemy in Tito’s Yugoslavia.

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76 AJ, 212–18, Analiza o sprovođenju Osnovnog zakona o unutrašnjim poslovima and Delokrug rada i ovlašćenja Službe bezbednosti; AJ, 130–558.
77 AJ, 212–18, Izveštaj o deformacijama u radu Službe državne bezbednosti.
79 B. Dimitrijević, „Odjek Brionskog plenuma...“, 75–88. The restructuring of the republican SDBs was followed by the process of the reorganization, where the center became the main organization form, which covered a certain administrative territory in an “operative way”, while the SDBs at the “republic” level were mostly in charge of analytic, personnel, technical and other managing operations.
On the other hand, the Military Security Service (KOS), which provided much of the technical and investigative assistance in the 1966 affair, remained in the same position without any organizational changes or downsizing. Without its main competitor, the UDBA za Jugoslaviju, it became even more influential and omnipresent. Regardless of the personnel, organizational, and institutional changes in 1966–1967, the Yugoslav security services, the SDB and the KOS, remained influential instruments of the Yugoslav communist authorities until the 1991/92 war and the end of the existence of Yugoslavia.

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Summary

As with the other communist-governed states, socialist Yugoslavia had a broadly developed state and military security apparatus. The article describes the initial steps of the Department for the People's Protection (locally known as the OZNA). Since May of 1944, its role was to purge the so-called “enemies of the people” in the last days of the war and set up interior affairs organizations in all the Yugoslav republics, following their liberation. This service included the Military Counterintelligence branch as its “Third Component”, until the constitutional changes in the spring of 1946. Then, the OZNA split into two services:
the Department for the State Security (UDBA) and the Counterintelligence Service in the Yugoslav Army (KOS).

In the period up to the summer of 1948, the UDBA - State Security, dealt with all kind of “enemies of the people” in the civilian life of Tito’s Yugoslavia. After the break with the Soviet Union and other Cominform countries, both services, the UDBA and the KOS combined their efforts in combating all the pro-Stalin or pro-Soviet activities. The Counterintelligence Service had the difficult task of controlling the numerous army members that had previously been trained in the Soviet Union. Both services developed mechanisms and widened their structure and organization in society. The Federal-level UDBA was responsible for conducting intelligence activities against the neighboring Communist countries, controlling any possible security threats against the Yugoslav state. It was also tasked with running the notorious camp for the Cominform supporters at the Goli otok (Desolate Island) in the Adriatic, established in 1949. The period between 1949 and 1953 was the high point of security activities of both services.

After Stalin's death in March of 1953 and Yugoslavia's siding with the United States and NATO, the pressure from the East was eased. It led to changes in both services: important downsizing of personnel and a certain de-brutalization of the UDBA methods, which had been part of the fight against the Soviet supporters in the previous period. A new Intelligence Service was formed from the I Department of the UDBA, in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In 1955, the Army Counterintelligence Service was transformed into the Military Security Service with the establishing of the Military Police. In the State Security apparatus, further changes occurred in 1966, after Tito ousted Aleksandar Ranković, the Yugoslav vice-president, who had established and controlled the Yugoslav state security services from the very beginning. Regardless of the changes, both services remained influential until the 1991/92 war and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The article was written based upon the partially revealed state security service archival sources in the Archives of Yugoslavia, different local archives, as well as in-depth research of the military security service sources in the Military Archives in Belgrade, still less known even among the domestic scientific public in Serbia and in the former Yugoslavia.

KEYWORDS: Yugoslavia, State Security, Counterintelligence Service, Josip Broz Tito, Aleksandar Ranković, OZNA, UDBA, KOS